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Abstract—This paper provides a comprehensive literature
review on applications of economic and pricing theory to se-
curity issues in wireless networks. Unlike wireline networks, the
broadcast nature and the highly dynamic change of network
environments pose a number of nontrivial challenges to security
design in wireless networks. While the security issues have not
been completely solved by traditional or system-based solutions,
economic and pricing models recently were employed as one
efficient solution to discourage attackers and prevent attacks to
be performed. In this paper, we review economic and pricing
approaches proposed to address major security issues in wireless
networks including eavesdropping attack, Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack such as jamming and Distributed DoS (DDoS), and
illegitimate behaviors of malicious users. Additionally, we discuss
integrating economic and pricing models with cryptography
methods to reduce information privacy leakage as well as to
guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of information in
wireless networks. Finally, we highlight important challenges,
open issues and future research directions of applying economic
and pricing models to wireless security issues.
Keywords- Security, wireless networks, pricing models, eco-
nomic theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have been widely used in several applica-
tions in different areas. The shared and easy to access wireless
medium is undoubtedly the biggest advantage of wireless
networks. However, the exposed nature of the wireless medium
makes wireless networks vulnerable to various attacks. The
most commonly seen attack in wireless networks is eaves-
dropping in which attackers aim at acquiring important/private
information of users. Another well-known attack is Denial-of-
Service (DoS) such as jamming attack and Distributed DoS
(DDoS) attack which attempt to interfere and disrupt network
operations by exhausting the resources available to legitimate
systems and users. Although the attacks have different strate-
gies and objectives, they all lead to serious consequences
such as degrading the network performance and Quality of
Service (QoS) as well as losing important data, reputations,
and revenue.
To combat the attacks, several security mechanisms have
been proposed. For example, for the eavesdropping attack,
cryptographic techniques [1], [2] have been commonly applied
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at the upper network layers to reduce the attacker’s ability
to decode private information. For the DoS attack, frequency
hopping techniques [3], [4] have been adopted as anti-jamming
solutions. However, such traditional techniques face many
challenges or even may not work in future generation wireless
networks that become more decentralized and ad-hoc in nature.
For example, cryptographic techniques often require central-
ized authorities, additional secure channels for key exchanges,
and more computation power for encryption/decryption. The
requirements are hardly fulfilled in decentralized mobile envi-
ronments.
A. What and Why Economic and Pricing Approaches
Economic and pricing methods have been recently devel-
oped to address various security issues in wireless networks.
They allow to model and analyze modern distributed system
operations such as negotiations among independent and selfish
users. Thus they can be adopted in the wireless security scenar-
ios to model and analyze complex interactions among attackers
and legitimate users/defenders. Through the interactions, the
legitimate users can learn or predict the malicious behaviors
of the attackers, then having optimal defending and reaction
strategies based on equilibrium analysis. Besides, economic
and pricing models provide incentive mechanisms to prevent
the attackers from launching attacks or executing illegitimate
behaviors. In other words, the traditional or system-based
approaches are considered to be the "hard" approaches that
require additional hardware and software implementations
while the economic and pricing approaches are considered to
be the "soft" approaches that motivate and incentivize the users
not to launch attack actions as it is not profitable for them to
do so. The economic and pricing approaches are natural and
inherent in the decision making of all the network entities,
thus more efficient and more effective to employ.
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of using economic and pricing
models to prevent the DDoS attack in wireless networks.
For the DDoS attack [6], an external attacker controls a
large number of compromised users inside the network to
transmit radio jamming signals with high power to a target
system, and makes the system unavailable to respond to any
service requests from the legitimate users. Consider the simple
model in Fig. 1 which has two compromised users 1 and
2, the legitimate user (target of the attackers), and the base
station. Note that the compromised users and the legitimate
user are buyers while the base station acts as a resource
seller. In particular, the compromised users are assumed to
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Fig. 1. DDoS attack prevention using Bayesian-optimal pricing [5].
be rational. Since the compromised users need to consume
much network resources for their attack actions, they are
subject to the resource prices. Therefore, setting high resource
prices to the compromised users discourages them to spend
more powers to perform the attack actions. The Bayesian-
optimal pricing model [5] can be adopted to easily achieve
the purpose. Specifically, using the pricing model, the resource
price for each user is proportional to the probability that the
user performs a malicious action. Since the compromised users
have high probabilities of performing malicious actions, the
resource prices for them are high. On the contrary, low prices
are set for the legitimate users. The users are demotivated
to harm or attack other users because of the high cost. As
shown in the simulation results in [5], the additional cost for
a malicious user significantly decreases when the degree of
maliciousness of the user decreases.
The example discussed above shows that the DDoS attack
can be simply addressed by pricing without requiring addi-
tional hardware and software. For wireless attacks and security
issues in general, the economic and pricing approaches provide
the following advantages:
• Economic and pricing models as distributed solutions
maximize the secrecy capacity for the wireless com-
munications to combat the eavesdropping attack. These
distributed solutions do not require additional secure
channels for key exchanges as well as the complete
knowledge of all channel information. However, these
solutions often need the help of friendly jammers. The
specific approaches are reviewed in Section IV.
• Attackers can launch active attacks to cause the interfer-
ence to the channels. Economic and pricing models allow
legitimate users with good channels to trade their capaci-
ties with other legitimate users under interfered channels
in order to maximize the total utility of all legitimate users
in the network. More details are presented in Section V.
• As shown in the above example, an attacker can launch
its attacks through a large number of compromised users
inside the network. The compromised users are typically
distributed across network. Pricing models as decentral-
ized solutions are efficiently used to combat them. The
reviewed approaches are given in Section V.
• The distributed nature of the compromised users makes
them extremely difficult to be detected and traced. Eco-
nomic and pricing models provide the legitimate users
sufficient incentive to perform monitoring of other users
to quickly detect and isolate the compromised users.
Section V discusses further the related approaches.
• In realistic wireless environments, the legitimate users
often face the risks of physical attacks. The risks arise if
their location information is revealed. By combining with
encryption methods, economic and pricing models pro-
vide privacy preserving mechanisms to solve the leakage
of users’ location information. Moreover, the economic
and pricing models provide incentive mechanisms to
users to form an anonymity set so that the attackers
cannot identify a particular user within the anonymity
set. Section VI presents the specific approaches.
• Apart from the aforementioned issues, there are other
security issues in spectrum allocation process in wireless
networks. The security issues mainly arise from the cheat-
ing and illegitimate behaviors of users which severely
deteriorate the efficiency of the allocation. Economic and
pricing models are used to guarantee that the users cannot
increase their payoffs with such illegal behaviors. The
related work is reviewed in Section VII.
Nevertheless, a common limitation of the economic and
pricing approaches is that they require stakeholders in the
system to be rational and react to the strategy that the stake-
holders achieve the highest benefit, whereas in some cases this
assumption does not hold.
B. Contributions of the Paper
Although there are several surveys related to the wireless
security, they only focus on a particular wireless network and
non-economic approaches. For example, surveys of security
issues in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are given in [7]
and [8]. A survey of techniques against DDoS attacks in
Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANETs) is presented in [6]. There
are also surveys or tutorials related to the general wireless
security, but they only consider one specific security issue, e.g.,
anti-jamming techniques [9], and physical layer security [10].
Recent surveys discuss the applications of game theory for
the security in computer-communication networks [11], [12].
However, they are not specifically from economic and pricing
perspectives, which are emerging as a promising approach.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no survey specifically
discussing the applications of economic and pricing models to
address the security issues in wireless networks. This motivates
us to deliver the survey with the comprehensive literature
review on economic and pricing models developed for the
wireless security.
For convenience, the related works in this survey are cate-
gorized according to wireless security issues which have been
addressed by economic and pricing models as shown in Fig 2.
Specifically, the economic and pricing models have solved the
following major security issues:
• Eavesdropping attacks with the common assumption that
there are supports from friendly jammers in the system.
3• DoS attacks with the common assumption that stakehold-
ers in the system are rational and react to the strategy that
they achieve the highest benefit.
• Privacy and confidentiality with the common assumption
that there is no collusion among stakeholders in the
system.
• Illegitimate behaviors with the common assumption that
stakeholders in the system may have cheating behaviors
to maximize their own utilities, but they do not cause
damage to other users.
Additionally, some other security issues such as the spectrum
sensing data falsification attack and faked sensing attack are
also discussed. Main results, advantages, drawbacks, and the
future directions of each approach are highlighted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II gives an overview of security issues in wireless net-
works. The basics and fundamentals of the economic and
pricing models used to address the wireless security issues
are given in Section III. Section IV reviews the applications
of the economic and pricing models for securing wireless com-
munication against eavesdropping attacks. Section V discusses
the economic and pricing approaches for the DoS attack.
Section VI presents economic and pricing approaches for the
information security concerning the information privacy and
confidentiality. Sections VII considers how to use the pricing
strategies to deal with illegitimate and cheating behaviors in
wireless networks. Furthermore, applications of economic and
pricing models for the spectrum sensing data falsification and
faked sensing attacks are given in Section VIII. Section IX
summarizes important challenges, open issues, and future re-
search directions. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section X.
The list of abbreviations used in this paper is given in Table I.
TABLE I
MAJOR ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Description
ACA-A Alternative Ascending Clock Auction
ACA-T Traditional Ascending Clock Auction
CA/CDF Cryptographic Authority/Cumulative Distribution Function
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability triad
CRN Cognitive Ratio Network
DoS/DDoS Denial-of-Service/Distributed Denial-of-Service
EBV Encrypted Bit Vector
FJ Friendly Jamming
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
LSA Licensed Shared Access
MANET Mobile Ad hoc NETwork
NUM Network Utility Maximization
OPE Order Preserving Encryption
PD/PU/SU Primary Destination/Primary User/Secondary User
SINR Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio
SSDF Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
TLC/TTP Time Lapse Cryptography/Trusted Third Party
VCG/GSP Vickrey-Clarke-Groves/Generalized Second-Price auction
II. OVERVIEW OF WIRELESS SECURITY ISSUES
Wireless networks play an extremely important role in many
applications. However, security for wireless networks remains
a big challenge. The main reason is that accessing wireless
networks from users does not require physical connections.
It is thus much easier for attackers to launch various attacks
to target users or systems in wireless networks. This section
briefly reviews security issues in wireless networks which have
been addressed by economic and pricing models. Specifically,
we first introduce different types of attackers and users in
wireless networks. Then, we discuss two major attacks in wire-
less networks, i.e., eavesdropping and DoS. Finally, we define
some information security issues and malicious behaviors of
users in wireless networks.
A. Users and attackers in wireless networks
Different types of users1 and attackers as well as their key
features in typical wireless networks are shown in Table II.
TABLE II
TYPES OF USERS/ATTACKERS AND THEIR FEATURES
Users/attackers Key features
Altruistic users Regular users or legitimate users which behave in such a way
to improve the overall network performance
Selfish users Regular users or legitimate users which behave in such a way
to maximize their own utilities
Compromised
users/bots Users within a network which launch insider attacks to a targetin the network
Malicious users Adversarial users which attempt to damage or harm other users
or systems
Eavesdrop-
per/wiretapper Unauthorized receiver which performs illegally capturing andreading data packets from legitimate sources
Jammer Adversarial user which launches the DoS attack by transmitting
a high power noise signal to degrade or corrupt the signal at
the intended receiver
Friendly jammer Assist legitimate sources by transmitting a so-called Friendly
Jamming (FJ) signal to reduce the data rate that is leaking from
the source to the eavesdropper
Active
eavesdropper Adversarial user which performs both jamming and eavesdrop-ping
B. Eavesdropping Attack
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless environments, an
eavesdropper is able to capture information from legitimate
communications. There are several cryptographic techniques
which have been implemented at the upper layers of wireless
networks, e.g., a secret key cryptography [1] and public
key cryptography [2], to reduce the eavesdropper’s ability
to decode the private information. However, these techniques
often require additional secure channels for key exchanges
and more computation power for encryption/decryption which
are both scare and expensive in mobile environments. Thus
security algorithms on the physical layer have been proposed
as an alternative. Exploiting physical characteristics of wireless
channels, e.g., channel gains, to protect the wireless commu-
nication against eavesdropping attacks is called physical layer
security [13]. Its objective is to maximize the transmission rate
of reliable information transmitted from a legitimate source to
an intended destination at which the eavesdropper is unable to
1Users and nodes are used interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
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Fig. 3. Eavesdropping attack model with a source, a destination, an
eavesdropper, and a friendly jammer.
decode the information. The maximum reliable rate is namely
secrecy capacity or secrecy rate. It is defined as the difference
between the capacity of the source-destination channel, i.e.,
the legitimate channel, and that of the source-eavesdropper
channel, i.e., the wiretap channel [14].
To improve the secrecy capacity, one common solution is
to employ Friendly Jamming (FJ) signal to degrade the signal
quality at the eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 3. However,
employing the FJ signal also decreases the quality of the
legitimate channel. This problem can be considered to be a
power allocation issue which has been efficiently solved by
pricing models such as auctions or game theory. Therefore, it
is interesting to discuss how to improve the secrecy capacity
by using economic and pricing models which are reviewed in
Section IV.
C. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
A DoS attack is an active attack in which adversaries
attempt to exhaust resources available to legitimate users.
There are three common types of the DoS attack in wireless
networks, i.e., the jamming attack, DDoS attack, and black
hole attack.
1) Jamming attack: In the jamming attack, adversaries as
jammers transmit Radio Frequency (RF) jamming signals with
high power to disrupt or cause interference to the legitimate
communications between sources and destinations. While at-
tempting to cause the interference, the jammers are subject to
the cost of power. Anti-jamming schemes using power pricing
strategies [15], [16] can be applied to discourage jammers to
consume power for their jamming actions.
2) Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack: A DDoS attack is a
large-scale, coordinated attack on the availability of network
resources. This attack is typically launched indirectly through
a large number of compromised nodes, i.e., bots, inside the
network. The bots are illegally tampered and manipulated
to launch the DDoS attack to a target system, e.g., a base
station. They are practically controlled by an external attacker
of the network. The DDoS attack is known as one of the most
severe attacks due to the use of thousands of bots distributed
over the network. However, since the bots consume network
resources, they can be effectively prevented through behavior-
based pricing policies which are reviewed in Section V-B.
3) Black hole attack: The black hole attack attemps to
destruct network services such as packet routing or forwarding.
Indeed, in a typical routing protocol, a source broadcasts a
route request packet to all intermediate nodes before sending
data packets to its destination. Then, the nodes which are in
the route towards the destination reply the source with route
reply packets. There may exist a malicious node which claims
itself of having the shortest route to the destination and then
later drops incoming packets instead of forwarding them to
the destination. Such an attack is called black hole attack, and
the malicious node which performs the attack is called black
hole node. Pricing mechanisms are applied to provide nodes
incentives to forward packets rather than dropping them [17].
D. Information Security Issues
Information security is the prevention of unauthorized ac-
cess, damage, leakage, modification, and recording of infor-
mation [18]. Generally, the information security is defined
as the CIA attributes including confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. In particular, the confidentiality makes the infor-
mation unavailable or undisclosed to unauthorized users while
the integrity guarantees that the information is not modified
or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. Besides, information
privacy is perceived as part of information security.
Information privacy is defined as the ability of the user to
control one’s personal information when this information is
5acquired and used [19]. Enhancing the information privacy
of users requires privacy preserving mechanisms. Traditional
solutions in wireless networks are to employ ciphertext. Ci-
phertext is the result of encryption performed on plaintext
using an algorithm, called a cipher or cypher [20]. There-
fore, the ciphertext is known as encrypted information which
contains a form of the original plaintext that is unreadable
without the proper cipher to decrypt it. The key used in the
encryption cipher is called a cryptographic key. The ciphertext
can be generated by cryptographic algorithms such as Time
Lapse Cryptography (TLC) [21] and keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) [22]. The TLC uses a private
key to encrypt each user’s information, and the private key
is not known to anyone until a predefined future time. After
that time, the private key is published, and anyone can decrypt
the ciphertext. The HMAC is a hashing method which uses a
secret cryptographic key in conjunction with a cryptographic
hash function, e.g., MD5 or SHA-1 [22].
Besides the TLC and HMAC, users’ information can be
encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem [23], i.e., a probabilistic
asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography, or by the
Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) [24], i.e., a deterministic
encryption scheme which encrypts plaintexts to ciphertexts
with the same order. An interesting property of these schemes
is homomorphic which allows computations to be performed
on ciphertexts, e.g., encrypted bids, and the decrypted results
match those of operations performed on the plaintext, e.g.,
original bids.
E. Illegitimate Behaviors In Wireless Networks
Economic and pricing approaches have recently been ap-
plied to wireless networks with an increasing trend. In par-
ticular, they have been used to solve several wireless security
issues as mentioned in Section I. However, introducing pricing
to wireless systems can lead to security issues that deserve
discussion in our survey. These security issues mostly come
from using auctions in which users as buyers, i.e., bidders, sub-
mit their bids, i.e., bidding prices, for the requested resources,
e.g., spectrum. To increase payoffs, the users may perform the
illegitimate behaviors as described in Table III.
TABLE III
ILLEGITIMATE BEHAVIORS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Behaviors Definitions Consequences
False-name
bid cheating Dishonest action in whichmultiple names, i.e., e-mail
addresses, are submitted by a
single user
Reduce the seller’s revenue
and other bidders’ utilities
Collusion Cheating behavior in which a
bidder as a buyer seeks out
and persuades other bidders to
propose a lower price to the
seller. A collection of the bid-
ders is called a bidding ring
Reduce the seller’s revenue
and pose severe threats to the
efficiency of spectrum alloca-
tion
Bid-rigging A form of collusion in which
an untrustworthy auctioneer
conspires with greedy bidders
Illegally fix the price and ma-
nipulate auction
Summary: This section describes security issues in wireless
networks involving eavesdropping attack, DoS attack, and
misbehaviors of users in wireless networks. The common chal-
lenge of the security issues is to determine exactly locations of
attackers, malicious users as well as their misbehaviors since
the attackers and malicious users may be distributed across
over the network. Economic and pricing models can enhance
secrecy capacity and encourage malicious users to refrain from
misbehaving without requiring the perfect knowledge of their
locations. To easily understand how to apply the economic and
pricing models for the security issues in wireless networks, the
next section presents basics and fundamentals of economic and
pricing models used in this survey.
III. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMIC AND
PRICING THEORY FOR SECURITY IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Economic and pricing approaches have been recently ap-
plied to address various security issues in wireless networks
due to the aforementioned benefits. In this section, we present
the background of the economic and pricing models as well as
the rationale behind their use to enhance the wireless security.
A taxonomy of economic and pricing models used for the
wireless security is shown in Fig. 4. Note that there may
exist several different pricing models depending on how to
set the price as presented in [25] and [26]. For example,
when the price is set based on cost analysis, we have cost-
based pricing, or when the price is set through the profit
maximization problem, we have profit maximization pricing.
In particular for our survey, the price is set or optimized using
game models, auction mechanisms, and the Network Utility
Maximization (NUM) problem. Thus there are three pricing
models correspondingly, i.e., game-theoretic pricing, auction-
based pricing, and Network Utility Maximization (NUM)-
based pricing, as shown in Fig. 4.
A. Game-Theoretic Pricing
In game theory, a multi-participant decision scenario is
modeled as a game in which each participant as a player selects
actions to achieve the best possible payoff while anticipating
actions from other players [27]. In the following, we briefly
present game theoretic-pricing models which have been widely
used to improve security in wireless networks.
1) Non-cooperative game: In a non-cooperative game,
players are selfish. This means that the players maximize
only their own payoffs without forming coalitions or making
agreements with each other [28].
Consider a scenario of wireless security involving a legit-
imate source-destination pair, an eavesdropper, and multiple
friendly jammers. The friendly jammers act as the sellers
which compete for selling the FJ powers to the source to
improve its secrecy capacity. While attempting to maximize
their own utilities, the sellers as the players are selfish, and the
interactions among them can be modeled as a non-cooperative
game. The game is generally defined as a triplet (N ,P,Π),
where N is the set of N players, P is the set of strategies of
players, and Π is the set of payoff functions of the players.
Let pi denote the strategy of player i and Pi denote the set of
strategies of player i, then P = P1 × · · · × PN is namely the
Cartesian product of the individual strategy sets. The vector
of strategies of N players is p = (p1, . . . , pN ), and the vector
of corresponding payoffs is pi = (pi1(p), . . . , piN (p)) ∈ RN ,
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where pii(p) is the payoff of player i given the player’s chosen
strategy and the others’ strategies.
Definition 1. A set of strategies or a strategy profile p∗ =
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ) is called a Nash equilibrium if for every player
i [29],
pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ pii(pi,p∗−i),∀pi ∈ Pi, (1)
where p−i = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ) is a vector of
strategies of all players except player i.
The inequality in (1) shows that the Nash equilibrium is a
stable strategy profile, meaning that none of the players can
improve its payoff by unilateral deviation. The reason is that
at the Nash equilibrium, all players simultaneously choose the
best responses to each other’s strategies. In practice, the Nash
equilibrium may not always exist, or there may exist multiple
Nash equilibria which can make players unclear about which
one to choose. Therefore, checking and proving the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are important when
setting prices based on the non-cooperative game. The exis-
tence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium can be proved by
checking if the strategy of each player is non-empty, compact,
and convex, and if its payoff function is a concave or quasi-
concave function. Other methods are the Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem [30] and the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
[31]. Another popular method is to prove that the game is
a potential game or supermodular game. Because the non-
cooperative game models the conflict of players, the attack-
defense game was formulated as the non-cooperative game
[32]. The corresponding Nash equilibrium allows intrusion
detection systems to have an optimal defense strategy. In the
context of wireless security, the non-cooperative game was
used to discourage compromised users to launch DoS attacks
to legitimate users [33].
2) Stackelberg game: Different from the non-cooperative
game, the Stackelberg game [34] is a sequential game in which
the players can be leaders or followers. The leaders will make
the first move, and then the followers will make corresponding
moves based on the leaders’ moves. The aim of Stackelberg
games is to model sequential multi-agent decision making
processes and maximize the profit of the leaders and that of
the followers given the strategies of the leaders.
Consider again the scenario in Section III-A1 with two
friendly jammers as players, i.e., the sellers. Let P1 and
P2 denote the sets of pricing strategies of players 1 and 2,
respectively. Player 1 selects its pricing strategy p1 ∈ P1 to
maximize its payoff function pi1(p1, p2), and player 2 chooses
its pricing strategy p2 ∈ P2 to maximize its payoff function
pi2(p1, p2). Assume that player 2 decides its strategy before
player 1 does, then, player 2 is called the leader, and player 1
is called the follower. We have the following definitions [35]:
Definition 2. If there exists a function f : P2 → P1
such that, for any fixed p2 ∈ P2, pi1(fp2, p2) ≥ pi1(p1, p2),
∀p1 ∈ P1, where fp2 is the best response of player 1 given
p2, and if there exists p2s2 ∈ P2 such that pi2(fp2s2, p2s2) ≥
pi2(fp2, p2), then the pair (p1s2, p2s2) ∈ P1 × P2, where
p1s2 = fp2s2, is called a Stackelberg strategy pair.
In other words, the Stackelberg strategy is optimal for the
leader when the follower responds to the leader with the
optimal strategy. As presented in [26], the payoff of the leader
in the Stackelberg solution is guaranteed to be no less than
that in the Nash solution. The reason is that by choosing the
Stackelberg strategy, the leader imposes a favorable solution to
itself. This feature makes the Stackelberg game be an efficient
solution for the network security. For example, it allows a
defender to decide an optimal strategy after observing the
strategy of an attacker [36]. Also, the game optimizes the
defender’s utility if the attacker deviates from equilibrium
strategies [37].
B. Auction-Based Pricing
An auction can be used as a pricing mechanism for selling
commodities, i.e., resources in wireless security context, and
setting corresponding prices according to specific rules. Def-
initions of common terminologies in auctions such as bidder,
seller, auctioneer, ask, and bid can be found in [25]. Also, a
tutorial of auctions used for resource management in wireless
networks was provided in [38]. In what follows, we discuss
the auctions which have been used to improve the wireless
security.
1) English and Dutch auctions: English and Dutch auctions
are known as the open-outcry auctions in which bids of buyers
are disclosed to each other during the auction [39].
• English auction: The English auction is an ascending-
bid auction performed in several rounds. The auctioneer
initializes the lowest price of the resource and then
increases the price in the next rounds. The auctioneer
terminates the auction if there is no new higher bidding
price submitted by any buyer. The buyer with the highest
price wins the resource and pays the price not less than
7the lowest price that the seller can accept. The highest
price is also called a hammer price.
• Dutch auction: The Dutch auction is a descending-bid
auction in which the auctioneer or seller initializes a high
price for the resource and then decreases the price until
one buyer accepts the price.
Compared to the sealed-bid auction discussed in the next
section, the English and Dutch auctions have been used less
frequently for the wireless security due to the disclosed bids.
However, with their simplicity, they were still adopted to
quickly revoke the malicious users as proposed in [40].
2) Sealed-bid auction: Different from the English and
Dutch auctions, bidders in a sealed-bid auction submit sealed
bids to the auctioneer such that no bidder knows the bid
information of the others. The first- and second-price sealed-
bid auctions are two most common types of the sealed-bid
auction.
• First-price sealed-bid auction: The bidder with the high-
est price wins the commodity, and the winner pays the
seller the highest price.
• Second-price sealed-bid auction or Vickrey auction: In
this auction, the winner only pays the second-highest
price rather than the highest price that it submitted [41].
Since the winner pays the price less than its expected
price, the Vickrey auction motivates buyers to bid its
true valuation on the resource. Such an auction is thus
called a strategy-proof, truthful, or incentive compatible
mechanism. This feature enables the Vickrey auction to
be widely used for the wireless security to prevent the
misbehaviors of users.
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction: The VCG auction
is the extension of the Vickrey auction with multiple
commodities. In the VCG auction, the commodities are
allocated in a socially optimal manner, and the price that
the winner pays the seller equals the loss of the social
value caused by its winning the commodity. Since each
winner is charged by only the marginal harm to other
bidders, the VCG auction enables bidders to submit true
valuations in their bids. The VCG auction is thus strategy-
proof. However, since its objective is to maximize the
social welfare, the price set by the VCG auction is
sometimes too low. Thus the losers in the auction can
afford the prices. For example, the losers can collude to
win channels and then sublease the channels to others.
This concern can be resolved by integrating the VCG
auction with encryption methods as proposed in [42].
3) Double auction: In a double auction, buyers and sellers
simultaneously submit their bids, i.e., bidding prices, and
asks, i.e., asking prices, to an auctioneer, respectively [43].
Upon receiving the bids and asks, the auctioneer performs
matching between the sellers’ asks and the buyers’ bids as
follows. It first sorts the buyers’ bids in a descending order
and the sellers’ asks in an ascending order. The auctioneer
then finds the largest index m at which the ask pam is less
than or equal to the bid pbm, i.e., p
a
m ≤ pbm. The transaction
price p∗ = (pam + p
b
m)/2 is called a clearing price. The
corresponding buyer receives the resource, and the seller
receives the payment p∗. The process is repeated to match the
remaining buyers and sellers and to determine corresponding
transaction prices.
Compared to the VCG auction, the double auction achieves
more desirable properties. In addition to the truthfulness or
incentive compatibility, the double auction holds other prop-
erties such as the individual rationality, i.e., no participant
loses when joining the auction, and balanced budget, i.e., the
auctioneer gains positive benefit. Because of these properties,
the double auction was used to achieve the k-anonymity
location privacy as proposed in [44].
4) Share auction: Share auction is a market mechanism
for allocating a perfectly divisible resource, e.g., the power,
among bidders [45]. In the share auction, bidders submit their
bids, i.e., amount of requested resource, to the auctioneer.
Then, the resource allocation and the price for each bidder
are proportional to their bids. Consider a specific model
involving N source-destination pairs, a friendly jammer and
an eavesdropper. Sources as buyers, i.e., bidders, submit their
bids to compete for the FJ power Pi from the friendly jammer,
i.e., the seller, to increase their secrecy capacities. Based on
the share auction, the friendly jammer allocates its power to
source i as follows:
Pi =
biPmax
β +
∑N
j=1 bj
, (2)
where Pmax is the maximum power of the friendly jammer, bi
is the bid of source i, and β is any positive constant. Source i
then pays the jammer a price pi = λPi, where λ is the price
per unit of power. To determine the optimal bid b∗i , source i
finds bi so as to maximize its utility Ui. Ui is the difference
between the secrecy capacity change due to power Pi and price
pi. If λ is set to an appropriate value, then Ui is quasi-concave
within a feasible region, and there exists an optimal bid b∗i to
optimize the source’s utility [46]. The desirable outcome of
the auction is the Nash equilibrium such that no source has
an incentive to deviate its bidding strategy unilaterally.
5) Ascending Clock Auction (ACA): ACA is a type of
multiple-round auctions. In each round, the auctioneer an-
nounces a price, and bidders submit their demands at the given
price. The auctioneer increases the price until the total demand
meets the supply. To further understand the ACA process, we
consider a model with multiple sources as bidders, i.e., buyers,
a friendly jammer as a seller, and an eavesdropper. The FJ
power Pmax is traded as a single object, and the sources only
bid zero or Pmax. First, the friendly jammer sets an initial
asking price λ0 and broadcasts this price to all the sources.
Source i calculates the maximum utility, i.e., U∗i , that it can
obtain from purchasing Pmax. If U∗i ≤ 0, source i will bid
zero power. Otherwise, it will bid Pmax. If there are more than
one source bidding with Pmax, the friendly jammer increases
the asking price and then announces this price in the next
auction round. Given the new price, each source recalculates
its maximal utility to decide if it bids zero or Pmax. This
process is repeated until there is only one source bidding Pmax.
Generally, with the ACA, the bidders reveal their demands but
not prices to the auctioneer. Thus in addition to improving the
8secrecy capacity as discussed in this section, the ACA was
used to preserve the privacy for bidders as proposed in [47].
The summary of the above auctions along with their appli-
cations for the wireless security is given in Table IV. As seen,
auction mechanisms have been adopted to address various
security issues in wireless networks. Moreover, the Vickrey
auction has been more commonly used compared with the
other auctions due to its truthfulness guarantee.
C. Network Utility Maximization (NUM)-based Pricing
NUM is known as a dual-based distributed algorithm for
the network resource allocation which aims at maximizing the
social welfare subject to the resource constraint of the network
[51]. In the standard NUM problem, the social welfare is the
sum of utility functions of all users in the network. In the
context of wireless security, the utility functions can be the
secrecy capacities of sources. When the sources employ the
FJ powers from the friendly jammer to improve their secrecy
capacities, a certain cost is incurred to the friendly jammer.
Thus the total cost needs to be introduced in the standard
NUM problem, and the new problem is namely modified NUM
problem. As discussed in [26], to efficiently solve the modified
NUM problem, the pricing-based iterative solutions can be
adopted. Specifically, consider a model with N sources as
buyers which reserve powers from a friendly jammer, i.e., a
seller, to improve their secrecy capacities. Assume that the
friendly jammer charges source i a price per unit of power λi.
Given the price vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λN ), the modified NUM
problem is given by
max
P,
∑N
i Pi≤Pmax
N∑
i
(∆Ci(Pi)− λiPi) + (λ>P− c(P)), (3)
where Pi is the power that source i receives, P =
(P1, . . . , PN ), ∆Ci(Pi) is source i’s secrecy capacity change
due to Pi, c(P) is the total cost which is incurred to the friendly
jammer when it applies power P, Ui = (∆Ci(Pi) − λiPi) is
actually the utility function of source i, and (λ>P− c(P)) is
the profit of the friendly jammer. Source i determines Pi by
solving the following problem
Pi(λi) = arg max
Pi∈Di
Ui, i = 1, . . . , N, (4)
where Di represents a continuous range of power. Gener-
ally, Ui may not be a concave function, and (4) may not
be the convex optimization problem. However, as stated in
Section III-B4, if the friendly jammer sets the price λi to
the optimal value, the utility function Ui is a quasi-concave
shape function within the feasible interval. Thus there exists
an optimal Pi to maximize its utility. The optimal Pi can be
obtained using iterative methods.
Apart from improving the secrecy capacity as discussed
above, NUM was also adopted as distributed solutions to
prevent DDoS attacks as proposed in [5].
Summary: In this section, we present basics of economic
and pricing theory used to address wireless security issues.
Specifically, we provide definitions, mechanism descriptions,
and the rationale behind the use of economic and pricing mod-
els for the wireless security. Additionally, we give comparisons
between the models. In the next sections, we review economic
and pricing approaches for various security issues in wireless
networks.
IV. EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless transmission,
anyone within the communication range can intercept the
source’s information. An unauthorized receiver is called an
eavesdropper [52]. Power allocation is the major approach
used to improve secrecy capacity in that a friendly jammer al-
locates the Friendly Jamming (FJ) power to source-destination
links. This section reviews the applications of economic and
pricing models to maximize the secrecy capacity in wireless
networks. Note that the eavesdropper mentioned in this section
is passive. More specifically, two types of eavesdroppers are
discussed in this section:
• External eavesdropper: An external eavesdropper is an
unauthorized receiver which is not an intermediate node
in any path which is selected for relaying or forwarding
the information [52]. Centralized schemes in which the
objective is to optimize the secrecy capacity can be
applied. However, they suffer from the fact that the
friendly jammer needs to know exactly all the private
information of the sources, destinations, and eavesdrop-
per. Economic and pricing models as distributed solutions
can maximize the secrecy capacity without requiring the
perfect knowledge of all channel information.
• Internal eavesdropper: An internal eavesdropper is an
intermediate node in a path which is selected for relaying
or forwarding the information [52]. It may be an untrusted
relay node which tries to eavesdrop the information
coming from the source. Economic and pricing models
provide incentive mechanisms to friendly jammers to
contribute power to interfere the internal eavesdropper.
A. External Eavesdropper
This section reviews the applications of economic and pric-
ing models for the FJ power allocation between the friendly
jammer and the source-destination pairs to maximize the se-
crecy capacity. Economic and pricing models are developed for
different senarios. For example, when the model involves only
one friendly jammer and multiple source-destination pairs,
the single-side auction schemes can be used. For multiple
friendly jammers and multiple source-destination pairs, the
double auction or matching theory can be adopted.
1) Share auction: The authors in [46] applied the share
auction for the FJ power allocation to optimize the secrecy
capacity for sources. In the share auction, the FJ power is
split among sources, and their payments depend solely on
the bids [45]. The share auction is an appropriate solution
since it allows to allocate the FJ power to the sources in
a distributed manner with the limited local information. The
model is shown in Fig. 5 which consists of multiple source-
destination pairs, one friendly jammer, and one eavesdropper.
The sources as bidders compete for the power from the
friendly jammer as the seller. First, each source determines an
amount of power as a bid to maximize its utility, which is the
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A SUMMARY OF KEY FEATURES AND SUITABLE SCENARIOS OF AUCTION MECHANISMS USED FOR SECURITY ISSUES IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Auction type Market structure Key descriptions Suitable scenarios Solution
English auction [39]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers
• Open-outcry ascending-price auction: The winner pays
the second highest price • Information integrity
Nash
equilibrium
Dutch auction [39]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers
• Open-outcry descending price auction: The winner
pays the final price • Black hole attack
Nash
equilibrium
First-price sealed-bid
auction [41]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers • Sealed-bid auction: The winner pays the highest price
• Black hole attack
• Privacy concerns
• Faked sensing attack
Nash
equilibrium
Vickrey auction [41]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers
• Sealed-bid auction: The winner pays the second high-
est price
• Eavesdropping attack
• Privacy concerns
• User collusion/bid-rigging
Nash
equilibrium
Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG)
auction [48]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers
• Generation of the Vickrey auction with multiple com-
modities: The winner pays the price equal to the loss
of the social welfare due to its getting commodities
• Eavesdropping attack
• User collusion/bid-rigging
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
Share auction [49]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers
• Resources are allocated to buyers according to the ratio
of the buyers’ bids
• Eavesdropping attack
• DDoS attack
Nash
equilibrium
Ascending Clock
Auction (ACA) [50]
• Single-sided auction: A
seller and multiple buyers
• The resource price is increased at each round until the
total demand equals the total supply
• Eavesdropping attack
• False-name bids
Walrasian
equilibrium
Double auction [43]
• Double-sided auction:
Multiple sellers and
multiple buyers
• The auctioneer matches sellers’ asks and buyers’ bids • Eavesdropping attack• Privacy concerns
Market
equilibrium
Sources 
(buyers)
Destinations
FJ power 
requests
Jamming 
signal
Legitimate 
channels
Wiretap
 channels
Friendly 
jammers 
(sellers)
Power 
price
Eavesdropper
Fig. 5. FJ power allocation for multiple source-destination pairs based on
pricing models.
difference between the secrecy capacity change and the price
that the source pays the firendly jammer. The source’s secrecy
capacity is defined as in Section II-B. Given the sources’
bids, the friendly jammer allocates its power and charges
the sources according to the allocated power. The simulation
results showed that the secrecy capacity for the source obtained
by the proposed solution is close to that of the centralized
approaches. However, the proposed solution does not require
the exact knowledge of channel information which is difficult
to achieve in practice.
2) Traditional Ascending Clock Auction (ACA-T) and Al-
ternative Ascending Clock Auction (ACA-A): Different dis-
tributed auctions can be found in [50] for the FJ power
allocation, that are ACA-T and ACA-A. They are based on the
standard ACA as presented in Section III-B. The auctions are
used for the friendly jammer as the seller, i.e., the auctioneer,
to allocate the power to sources as bidders.
In ACA-T, the friendly jammer initially announces a reserve
price. Sources determine power demands to optimize their
utilities, each of which is defined similar to that in [46]. The
sources then submit their demands to the friendly jammer. The
friendly jammer iteratively adjusts the price so that the total
demand of the sources equals the maximum power. To ensure
that the total demand equals the friendly jammer’s maximum
power, i.e., the full utilization of the power, the final power for
each source is allocated according to the proportional-rationing
rule [53].
The ACA-T scheme guarantees the efficiency of the power
allocation. However, the sources are proved to have an incen-
tive to misreport their true demands since this can lead to a
greater utility. Thus the ACA-T scheme is not cheat-proof. To
address this problem, the ACA-A solution [53] was adopted.
Generally, the ACA-A has the same procedures as the ACA-T.
However, at every iteration in the ACA-A scheme, the friendly
jammer calculates the cumulative clinch [53], which is the
amount of power that each source is guaranteed to win at
the current iteration. The payment from each source is then
determined based on its cumulative clinch. It was proved that
the best strategy of the source at every iteration is to report
its true optimal demand given other sources’ true demands.
As shown in the simulation, the secrecy rates of both ACA-A
and ACA-T are much greater than that of the no-jamming case.
Also, the source’s maximum utility in the ACA-A is achieved
at its true optimal demand while that in the ACA-T is at a
value less than its true optimal demand. In other words, the
ACA-A is cheat-proof while the ACA-T is not.
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Given the advantages of the ACA-A scheme, the authors
in [54] employed this auction for the joint subcarrier and FJ
power allocation to improve the uplink secrecy rate in cellular
networks. The model consists of one base station, multiple
mobile users, and one eavesdropper. The base station as an
auctioneer allocates its subcarriers and FJ power to the mobile
users as bidders. The auction process is similar to that in
[50]. However, subcarrier prices are introduced in addition to
the power price. Moreover, the Lyapunov’s theorem [55] was
adopted to prove the convergence of the proposed scheme to
the optimal solutions of the subcarrier, FJ power, and prices.
3) Stackelberg game: To maximize the utilities for both the
sources and the friendly jammer, the authors in [56] adopted
the Stackelberg game (see Section III-A2). The model is
similar to that in [46] where the sources act as followers,
i.e., buyers, and the friendly jammer is the leader, i.e., the
seller. Given the power price of the friendly jammer, each
source determines the power demand so as to maximize its
utility. The source’s utility is defined similar to that in [46],
which was proved to be concave in the power. Then, the
optimal power demand is calculated by taking the first-order
derivative of the utility function. Given the sources’ demands,
the friendly jammer determines the power prices to maximize
its utility, i.e., the total payment from all sources, using the
first-order derivative. It was indicated that the best-response
function of the prices is a standard function, meaning that
it satisfies the conditions including positivity, monotonicity,
and scalability. Therefore, there exists a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium which is the pair of the optimal FJ power and
power price. The numerical results showed that the sum-
secrecy rate of the proposed approach is significantly improved
compared with that of the equal-power allocation algorithm.
However, the utility improvement of the friendly jammer was
not demonstrated.
The same approach can be found in [57]. However, in
addition to the secrecy rate, the authors in [57] considered
guaranteeing the fairness among sources and balancing their
utilities. Accordingly, in the first stage of the game, the
sources determine their FJ power demands so as to balance
obtained utilities among them through guaranteeing the Kalai-
Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS) [58]. The power
for each source is then calculated based on the property of
the KSBS and the power constraints. The simulation results
illustrated that the proposed scheme has the similar fairness
but much higher total utility of the sources than that of the
equal-power allocation algorithm.
To further enhance the utility for one source, multiple
friendly jammers are employed as presented in [59]. Unlike
[57], the source in this model acts as a leader, i.e., the
buyer, while friendly jammers are followers, i.e., sellers. The
source first determines optimal amounts of power from the
friendly jammers to maximize its utility, and then the friendly
jammers set the optimal prices to maximize their payments.
The simulation results showed that the utility of the source is
close to that of the centralized approach regardless of friendly
jammers’ locations. One of the reasons is that the source can
switch among friendly jammers for its best performance.
The Stackelberg game can be adopted to improve the
SUs
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Fig. 6. FJ power allocation in cognitive two-way relay networks.
secrecy capacity in relay networks as proposed in [60]. The
model involves one source-destination pair, one eavesdropper,
and one relay node. Since the relay node can communicate
with both the source and the destination, it can perform
friendly jamming. The relay node is thus called friendly relay.
The relay acts as the follower, i.e., the seller, which provisions
the information relay and friendly jamming for the source as
the leader, i.e., the buyer. The optimal power for the source
and the optimal price for the relay were then determined in a
similar way as in [59].
4) Vicrkey auction: To maximize the secrecy capacity and
to guarantee the truthfulness of the FJ power allocation, the
Vickrey auction can be used.
The first Vickrey auction approach was proposed in [61]
to improve the secrecy capacity for the communication of
Secondary User (SU) pairs in a cognitive two-way relay
network. The model involves one Primary User (PU), multiple
SU pairs, one relay, and one eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 6.
The relay acts as an auctioneer (seller) which provides the
relay and FJ powers to the sources of SU pairs, i.e., bidders
(buyers). The total power is divided into K equal units. Each
source first calculates its marginal secrecy rate when obtaining
ki ≤ K power units. The source then submits its bid which
includes the vector of K marginal secrecy rates and the
number of desired power units to the relay. The K highest
bids are deemed winning and the corresponding sources obtain
desired power units. Source i which wins ki units pays the ki
highest losing bids of the other sources. However, how each
source determines its desired power units was not explained.
The allocation in [61] may be less efficient if the total
power demand of winners is less than the maximum power
of the relay due to the unused power units. Therefore, the
authors in [62] adopted the sequential Vickrey auction which
allocates sequentially the power units to the sources until no
power unit remains. The sequential Vickrey auction repeats
several rounds, and each round is a typical Vickrey auction.
The proposed scheme improves the system efficiency and the
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total revenue for the relay compared with [61]. However, the
proposed scheme is recursive, and its complexity is high when
the number of power units is large.
Due to the resource constraint of one relay, multiple relays
may be used. The problem is to select K relays to maximize
the total secrecy rate for the source. The authors in [63] applied
the VCG auction, i.e., a generalization of the Vickrey auction
for multiple items, to the model with one source-destination
pair, one eavesdropper, and multiple relays. First, relays as
sellers report the channel information to the source as the
buyer. The source calculates the secrecy rate for each relay and
selects K relays which provide the maximum sum of secrecy
rates. The selected relay receives the total payoff including: (i)
the expected payoff and (ii) the transfer payment. The expected
payoff is proportional to the price per unit of secrecy rate
achieved by the relay and the probability of the relay being
chosen. The transfer payment of the relay is the difference
in the total expected payoff of other relays with and without
the relay in the system. The payment strategy enables the
proposed approach to achieve the incentive compatibility. The
simulation results showed that when a relay’s real secrecy rate
increases, i.e., higher probability of true report, its total payoff
increases.
The VCG-based scheme in [63] cannot achieve the balanced
budget since the sum of all selected relays’ transfer payments
is less than zero. To address this issue, the authors in [64]
proposed a new transfer payment based on the sum of other
relays’ expected payoffs given the reported information of one
relay. It was proved that the new transfer payment can perform
a payment reallocation among relays, and the total transfer
payment of all relays is zero. Therefore, the system can achieve
the balanced budget.
Using the model in [59], the authors in [65] applies the
Vickrey auction for the joint bandwidth and FJ power allo-
cation. Generally, the source selects a friendly jammer which
maximizes the source’s secrecy rate and then allocates the
access bandwidth to the friendly jammer. Specifically, the
source as the seller announces an amount of bandwidth that
can be allocated to a friendly jammer. The friendly jammers as
the bidders determine their optimal FJ powers, i.e., bids. Given
the bids, the source calculates the corresponding secrecy rates
and selects a friendly jammer with the highest secrecy rate as
the winner. The winner pays the source the FJ power so that
the corresponding secrecy rate is at least the second-largest
one. The simulation result showed that the proposed solution
outperforms the approach based on the Stackelberg game [66]
in terms of the average secrecy rate.
A joint time slot and FJ power allocation can be found in
[67]. This approach aims to improve the secrecy rate for the
PU-Primary Destination (PD) pair in Cognitive Raio Networks
(CRNs). The model consists of one PU-PD pair, multiple SUs,
and one eavesdropper. The PU acts as an auctioneer, i.e., a
seller, which selects one of SUs, i.e., bidders, for the jamming
service. Accordingly, each SU submits its bid including (i)
the FJ power, (ii) a time fraction, i.e., the time for the SU
to transmit the PU’s data to the PD, and (iii) the channel
information related to the SU. The PU calculates the secrecy
rate corresponding to each SU. The SU which can provide the
highest secrecy rate is selected as the winner. It then provides
the PU the second-highest bid, and receives a time slot as
a reward. In fact, to enhance the efficiency of the time slot
allocation, the PU should incorporate time slot requests of
SUs when evaluating bids, which is not done in [67].
5) Matching theory: Consider a more general scenario
including multiple source-destination pairs, multiple friendly
jammers, and one eavesdropper. The authors in [68] adopted
the matching theory [69] to match each source with each
friendly jammer to maximize the sum of utilities of sources
and friendly jammers. First, friendly jammers as sellers an-
nounce their FJ power and offered prices. Then, each source
as the buyer calculates its utility with each friendly jammer.
The utility is the source’s secrecy rate minus the price that
the source pays the friendly jammer. The source bids for its
friendly jammer which can maximize the source’s utility. If the
friendly jammer receives only one bid, the friendly jammer and
the corresponding source will match together. If the friendly
jammer receives more than one bid, it will increase the offered
price. This process is repeated until there is no new offered
price from any friendly jammer. The simulation results showed
that the proposed scheme improves significantly the average
secrecy rate and social welfare compared with the random
matching [70]. However, the complexity of the proposed
algorithm is much higher, especially when the number of
sources or friendly jammers is large.
6) Double auction: The authors in [71] extended the model
in [67] with multiple eavesdroppers and multiple PUs. SUs
provision the FJ power to PUs to maximize the secrecy rates
for the communications between the PUs and the Base Station
(BS) while guaranteeing some economic properties such as
truthfulness, individual rationality, and balanced budget. The
double auction is thus an appropriate solution. In this model,
PUs are sellers, SUs are buyers, and the BS is the auctioneer.
A PU’s ask, i.e., asking price, is its minimum secrecy rate
requirement, and an SU’s bid, i.e, bidding price, is a vector
of all PUs’ secrecy rates that the SU can provide under its
minimum bandwidth requirement. After receiving PUs’ asks
and SUs’ bids, the BS matches one PU to at most one potential
SU by using the maximum weighted matching algorithm [72].
Then, the BS determines the winning PUs and SUs as well
as the clearing price similar to those in Section III-B3. The
winning PUs receive the winning SUs’ power, and the winning
SUs receive the winning PUs’ access bandwidth.
The model in [71] was designed for a static CRN. In
real environments, the SUs may join and leave the networks
dynamically, and thus a dynamic double auction can be used
as proposed in [73]. Accordingly, the auction period is divided
into multiple time slots. Since the bid of an SU includes the
arrival and departure time in addition to the bidding price,
the auction needs to ensure that the SU cannot obtain higher
utility by cheating its arrival or departure time. To address this
issue, a preservation price was introduced which particularly
depends on the reported arrival and departure time of the SU.
An SU is selected for participating in the auction if the SU
has a bidding price larger than or equal to its preservation
price. The user assignment, winner determination, pricing
mechanism are then applied similar to those in [71]. However,
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the proposed solution in [73] is only applicable to the scenario
where the SUs rent a channel for one time slot. The long-
term leasing scenario with multiple time slots needs to be
considered.
7) Non-cooperative game: In practice, a source can be
equipped with multiple antennas, and it can generate the FJ
signal along with the information signal without requiring
an external friendly jammer. The authors in [74] employed
the multiple antennas to improve the secrecy rate for two
source-destination pairs in the presence of one eavesdropper.
To discourage the sources from acting selfishly which may
interfere with each other, the non-cooperative game and a
pricing factor, i.e., a price per unit of power, were adopted.
Accordingly, the strategy of each source is to find its FJ power
to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate and the
price that it pays. The optimal solution is obtained using the
KKT conditions [75]. By iteratively using the pricing factor to
set the power for both sources, the game converges to the Nash
equilibrium. However, such optimal solutions of the price and
FJ power require the perfect knowledge of the eavesdropping
channel which is challenging in practice.
B. Internal Eavesdropper
An internal eavesdropper typically refers to an untrusted
relay in relay networks. The following discusses how to apply
pricing models for the interaction between sources and friendly
jammers to prevent eavesdropping from untrusted relays.
1) Utility maximization: The authors in [76] aim to maxi-
mize the secrecy rate for the two-way untrusted relay network
using the utility maximization problem. Fig. 7 shows such
a general network with multiple pairs of two sources. The
considered model consists of one untrusted relay, i.e, the
eavesdropper, one pair of two sources, and multiple friendly
jammers. The sources as buyers buy power from the friendly
jammers, i.e., sellers, to maximize the sum of sources’ utilities.
The sum of sources’ utilities can be considered to be the
source pair’s utility which is the sum of secrecy rates of the
two sources minus the total price that the sources pay the
friendly jammer. The optimal power of each friendly jammer
is then determined using the first-order derivative. The friendly
jammer’s optimal power depends on its price and the other
friendly jammers’ power. As shown in the simulation results,
when the price is high, the bought power reduces or even
becomes close to zero. However, if the price is low, the friendly
jammers receive low benefit. Thus cooperative games can be
applied to achieve the optimal solutions of FJ power and price.
2) Stackelberg game: To improve utilities of sources and
friendly jammers in the two-way untrusted relay system, the
Stackelberg game can be used as proposed in [77]. The model
is similar to that in [76] in which the two sources, i.e., buyers,
are the leaders, and the friendly jammers are followers, i.e.,
sellers. The sources determine their optimal FJ powers, and
then the friendly jammers determine optimal power prices to
maximize their own payments. The optimal solutions were
obtained in a similar way as in Section IV-A3. It was proved
that in the special case with one friendly jammer located close
to the untrusted relay, the optimal power is monotonically
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Fig. 7. FJ power allocation in a multiuser two-way untrusted relay network.
decreasing and convex in the price when the other friendly
jammers’ prices are fixed. Therefore, there exists a unique
Stackelberg equilibrium which is the pair of the optimal FJ
power and price. However, a more general model with multiple
untrusted relays can be considered to be an extension.
3) ACA-A: To maximize secrecy rates for the sources
while guaranteeing the cheat-proof property of the FJ power
allocation, the authors in [78] employed the ACA-A approach
[50]. The model is shown in Fig. 7 with multiple source-
destination pairs, one untrusted relay, i.e., the eavesdropper,
and one friendly jammer. The source-destination pairs act
as bidders which bid for the FJ power from the friendly
jammer as the auctioneer, i.e., the seller. All steps of the
power allocation process are implemented similar to those of
the ACA-A approach, but the utility of the bidder is source-
destination pair’s utility as defined in [76].
The ACA-A approach can also be found in [79], but
the FJ power is employed from the untrusted relay itself,
i.e., the eavesdropper, to maximize the secrecy rate in a
cooperative OFDMA network. The model includes multiple
source-destination pairs as bidders and one untrusted relay as
the auctioneer, i.e., the seller. Each bidder is assigned with
a subcarrier, and the problem is to allocate the FJ power to
each subcarrier to maximize the secrecy rate of the information
communication on the subcarrier. Each bidder first defines its
utility which is the difference between its secrecy rate and the
price that it pays the relay. The bidders then submit FJ power
requests to the relay to maximize the bidders’ utilities. The
optimal powers for the bidders are then obtained by using the
ACA-A algorithm in [78]. The simulation results showed that
the proposed scheme can improve the system sum secrecy
rate around 5% compared with the Stackelberg game-based
approach [59]. However, since the relay is untrusted itself, it
can falsely report some information, e.g., the maximum power,
which degrades the sum secrecy rate.
Summary: This section discusses the applications of eco-
nomic and pricing models to enhance the secrecy capacity of
wireless communications. The reviewed approaches focus on
how to impair the eavesdropper’s ability to decode the infor-
mation from sources to destinations. The reviewed approaches
along with their references are summarized in Table V. From
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the table, we observe that the auctions and Stackelberg game
are mainly used for improving the secrecy capacity. Besides,
the approaches against the external eavesdropper gain more
attentions than the other types. However, eavesdroppers men-
tioned in this section are all passive, meaning that they only
monitor and do not interfere communication channels. The
next section reviews the applications of economic and pricing
models to address the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack which
interrupts or suspends network services.
V. DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS) ATTACK
A DoS attack is a deliberate action of one or many nodes
with the aim of interrupting or degrading services of wireless
networks. This section reviews applications of economic and
pricing models for defending the different DoS attacks. The
common DoS attacks include:
• Jamming attack: This attack is executed by generating
high-power signals to interfere the legitimate communica-
tion channels and thus reducing the SINR at the legitimate
receivers. While attempting to cause the interference, the
jammer is subject to the power price which is set by
an energy supplier. Thus power pricing strategies can be
applied to discourage jammers to spend power for their
jamming actions.
• DDoS attack: The DDoS attack, also known as the botnet
attack, uses the network resources of a large number
of compromised nodes, i.e., bots, inside the network to
encumber the legitimate accesses to the resources at a
receiver [6]. Pricing models as distributed solutions are
efficiently used to prevent attack behaviors of the bots.
• Black hole attack: In this attack, a malicious node in
a route, e.g., a relay node, silently drops or discards
incoming packets from a source without forwarding them
to the source’s intended destination. Pricing strategies can
be used to detect and isolate such malicious nodes.
A. Jamming Attack
Anti-jamming techniques such as the frequency hopping
[3] have been commonly used. However, such traditional
techniques require a large number of spectrum resources. Due
to the resource constraint, a more potential approach is to
exploit the cooperation of legitimate users in the network.
More specifically, legitimate users with good links can trade
their capacities with users under the jammed links.
Inspired by the aforementioned idea, the authors in [15]
proposed a cooperative anti-jamming scheme to optimize the
fairness-constrained network throughput. The model is shown
in Fig. 8 which includes one jammer and multiple legitimate
users each consisting of a source-destination pair. The jammer
degrades the throughput of the users by causing interference
on their channels with corresponding jamming powers, i.e., the
jamming profile. Each user has its own sensing probability
profile which includes probability that the user senses the
channels. The optimization problem is formulated to determine
the users’ sensing probability profiles to maximize the sum
utility, i.e., expected capacity, of all the users given the
Source 1
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Jammer
Jamming 
signal
Source 2
(buyer)
Source N
Destination 1
Destination 2
Cooperative 
link signal
Direct link signal
Destination N
Fig. 8. Anti-jamming technique based on the cooperation of legitimate users.
jammer’s jamming profile. The optimization problem is non-
convex, and the iterative best-response algorithm based on a
general pricing mechanism [80] was used. At each iteration,
the user maximizes its own utility minus a pricing term. The
pricing term generally depends on the marginal decrease of
the sum-utility of the other users due to the variation of the
user’s sensing probability profile. By using the second-order
derivative, the user’s utility was proved to be strongly concave
with respect to its channel sensing profile. Then, based on
the Descent Lemma in [81], the algorithm was proved to
converge to a feasible and stationary solution. The simulation
results showed that the total utility of the proposed algorithm
in [15] gains up to 19.8% improvement compared to that of
the frequency hopping algorithm.
In military environments, a jammer as an adversary can
perform jamming and eavesdropping simultaneously. The au-
thors in [16] enhanced the secrecy rate for one legitimate
source-destination pair in presence of such an adversary. The
secrecy rate is the capacity rate of the legitimate transmission
channel minus that of the wiretap channel. The adversary
causes interference to the destination while the source attempts
to increase its transmit power to maintain the desired secrecy
rate. The interaction between the adversary and the source is
thus modeled by a game in which the adversary’s strategy is
to find the jamming power to maximize its utility. In fact,
by consuming more power, the adversary is subject to the
linear price of the power which is set by an energy supplier.
Thus its utility is the difference between its capacity rate and
the price that it pays. The utility is concave in the jamming
power, and thus the optimal jamming power is determined
by using the first-order derivative. The source determines its
minimum transmit power subject to the desired secrecy rate
based on the optimal jamming power. The pair of the optimal
jamming power and transmit power thus forms a unique Nash
equilibrium. The simulation results showed that the legitimate
transmit power is always positively related to the jamming
power. Also, the jamming power decreases rapidly with the
increase of the power price. This naturally makes the adversary
more conservative with its jamming action.
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TABLE V
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR SECURING WIRELESS COMMUNICATION AGAINST EAVESDROPPING ATTACK (CN: CELLULAR
NETWORK, CRN: COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK, CWN: COOPERATIVE WIRELESS NETWORK, MANET: MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK, WRN:
WIRELESS RELAY NETWORK)
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
E
xt
er
na
l
ea
ve
sd
ro
pp
er
[46] Share auction
Friendly
jammer Sources FJ power
Seller allocates the FJ power proportionally to the
buyers’ demands.
Secrecy capacity
maximization
Nash
equilibrium MANET
[50]
ACA-T and
ACA-A
Friendly
jammer Sources FJ power
ACA-T: same as [46], but the seller adjusts the
power price until the total demand is smaller than
its maximum power.
ACA-A: same as the ACA-T but the seller
calculates the cumulative clinch.
Secrecy capacity
maximization,
allocation efficiency,
and cheat-proofness
Walrasian
equilibrium CWN
[54] ACA-A
Base
station
Mobile
users
Subcarriers
and FJ
power
Same as the ACA-A in [50], but the seller uses the
Lyapunov’s theorem to determine the optimal
solutions of subcarrier, FJ power, and prices.
Secrecy capacity
maximization,
allocation efficiency,
and cheat-proofness
Walrasian
equilibrium CN
[56]
[57]
Stackelberg
game
Friendly
jammer Sources FJ power
Buyers determine their FJ power demands, and then
the seller determines the power price.
Utility improvement for
both buyers and seller
Stackelberg
equilibrium CN
[59]
Stackelberg
game
Friendly
jammers Source FJ power
Same as [56], but the buyer determines its FJ power
for each seller.
Utility improvement for
both buyer and sellers
Stackelberg
equilibrium MANET
[60]
Stackelberg
game
Friendly
relay Source
Relay and
FJ power
Buyer determines the relay and FJ power, and then
the seller sets the optimal power price.
Utility improvement for
both buyer and sellers
Stackelberg
equilibrium WRN
[61]
Vickrey
auction
Friendly
relay SU pairs
Relay and
FJ power
Buyers submit their marginal secrecy rates as bids.
Buyers with the highest bids are winners and pay
the seller according to the Vickrey auction.
Secrecy rate
improvement
Nash
equilibrium CRN
[62]
Sequential
Vickrey
auction
Friendly
relay SU pairs
Relay and
FJ power
There are multiple rounds and in each round, the
seller allocates a power unit to a buyer with the
largest secrecy rate increase.
Secrecy rate
improvement,
allocation efficiency
Subgame
perfect
equilibrium
CRN
[63]
[64]
VCG auction Friendlyrelays Sources FJ power
Buyer selects a number of sellers which maximize
the sum of secrecy rates for the buyer. The payment
is based on the VCG auction.
Secrecy rate
maximization,
truthfulness, individual
rationality, and
balanced budget
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
CWN
[65]
Vickrey
auction Source
Friendly
jammers
Bandwidth
and FJ
power
Seller selects a buyer which maximizes its secrecy
rate. The winner obtains the bandwidth and pays
the seller its FJ power.
Average secrecy rate
improvement,
trustfulness
Nash
equilibrium MANET
[67]
Vickrey
auction PU SUs
Time slot
and FJ
power
Same as [65], but the winner gets the time slot from
the seller.
Secrecy rate
improvement,
trustfulness
Nash
equilibrium CRN
[68]
Matching
theory
Friendly
jammers Sources FJ power
Based on prices offered by the sellers, each buyer
bids for its seller which maximizes its utility. The
seller can adjust price to gain its utility.
Average secrecy rate
improvement, social
welfare maximization
Competitive
equilibrium MANET
[71]
[73]
Double
auction PUs SUs
Bandwidth
and FJ
power
Each seller is matched with each buyer by using the
maximum weighted matching algorithm and the
double auction rule.
Truthfulness, individual
rationality, and
balanced budget
Competitive
equilibrium CRN
[74]
Non-
cooperative
game
Power
supplier Sources FJ power
Buyers obtain the optimal FJ power by using the
KKT conditions.
Secrecy sum-rate
improvement
Nash
equilibrium CN
In
te
rn
al
ea
ve
sd
ro
pp
er [76]
Utility
maximization
Friendly
jammers Sources FJ power
Buyers obtain the optimal FJ power by solving the
problem which is the maximization of their utilities.
Utility maximization
for buyers
Optimal
solution WRN
[77]
Stackelberg
game
Friendly
jammers Sources FJ power
Buyers determine the optimal FJ power, and then
the sellers set the optimal prices.
Utility maximization
for buyers and sellers
Stackelberg
equilibrium WRN
[78] ACA-A
Friendly
jammer
Source
pairs FJ power Same as [50].
Secrecy rate
maximization
Walrasian
equilibrium WRN
[79] ACA-A
Untrusted
relay
Source-
destination
pairs
FJ power
Same as [78], but the secrecy rate of a buyer is
defined for each subcarrier which depends on the
mutual information of private channels.
Sum-secrecy rate
maximization
Walrasian
equilibrium WRN
B. Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack
Compared with the jamming attack, the DDoS attack is
more severe [82] since it is launched by a large number
of malicious nodes, i.e., compromised nodes or bots, which
are distributed across the network. In models discussed in
this section, the malicious nodes harm regular nodes by
transmitting noises with the high power at a base station. The
malicious nodes are also assumed to be rational. Since the
malicious nodes need to use more network resources for the
attack actions, they are subject to the resource price which is
set by the base station. Thus pricing models can be used to
set the amount of network resources according to the users’
behaviors such that their malicious behaviors are prevented.
The authors in [33] addressed the DDoS attack in a multiple-
access system with the coexistence of malicious users, i.e.,
compromised users, and selfish users. The model is shown
in Fig. 1 in which a base station as a seller allocates the
power to users (the malicious and selfish users) as buyers
to satisfy their rate-based QoS requirements. Since the base
station does not use the successive interference cancellation,
each user suffers from the interference of all the other users.
Thus the interaction among them can be modeled by the non-
cooperative game in which each user’s strategy is to determine
the allocated power to maximize its utility. The utility of the
user is a function of its capacity rate, the demand of other
users, the individual price that it pays the base station, and its
private type. In particular, the user’s private type indicates the
extent of its behavior [83], and the individual price is inversely
proportional to the user’s private type. Such a pricing strategy
discourages malicious users to spend much power to harm the
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TABLE VI
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR SECURING WIRELESS COMMUNICATION AGAINST EAVESDROPPING
ATTACK
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[46] • Do not require exact knowledge of channel information • Support only one eavesdropper
[50] • Be easy to be implemented and have fast convergence • Support only one eavesdropper
[56] • Achieve win-win solution and fast convergence • Do not guarantee the fairness among sources
[62] • Achieve high power utilization and do not require external FJ jammers • Support only one relay and have high complexity
[63] • Support multiple relays • Do not achieve the balanced budget
[68] • Support multiple friendly jammers and sources • Have high complexity
other users. Using the Crammer’s rule [84], the best response
power allocation for users is determined and converges to a
unique Nash equilibrium. However, how to learn the users’
private types was not specified.
To learn private types of users, the authors in [85] assumed
that the base station can observe the users in a sufficient
time to get probabilistic information of their behaviors. The
base station’s problem is to find the resource allocation that
maximizes the users’ social welfare, i.e., the sum of utilities,
while preventing the maliciousness of users. Here, the utilities
of malicious users are multiplied with factors related to their
probabilistic information, namely degree of maliciousness. The
utility of each user is strictly concave in its allocated power.
The Lagrange multiplier method is then used to solve the
optimization problem with their interpretations as powers and
prices that the users are willing to pay. At each iteration,
the power prices are updated by using the gradient projection
method, and the users determine their optimal power. It was
proved that there exists a unique optimal solution for the
allocated power and the prices. It is also worth noting that the
optimal price for each user is proportional to its probability
belief, i.e., the probability that the user performs a malicious
action. This means that the price for the users is higher with
higher probability belief. Thus they are incentivized to not
harm other users to avoid high cost.
It can be seen that the pricing strategy in [85] is a type of the
Bayesian pricing [86] in which prices for users are set based on
the probabilistic assumptions on their behaviors. This pricing
strategy is also similar to the differential pricing scheme [87]
which sets different prices for different users according to their
behaviors. However, the differential pricing scheme aims to
maximize the profit of the base station rather than maximizing
the users’ social welfare. Generally, the challenge of such
pricing mechanisms is the inaccuracy of estimating the users’
behaviors, especially when the observation time is insufficient.
The Gaussian process regression learning technique using
training data sets [88] can be applied to improve the estimation
accuracy as proposed in [89]. Moreover, the learning technique
also allows the base station to infer the utilities of both regular
and malicious users. As shown in the simulation results, the
estimated utilities of users are almost the same as their actual
utilities. In other words, the users’ utilities are assumed to
be known at the base station. Thus the centralized auction
mechanisms can be adopted in which the base station makes
centralized decisions on both the power level and price for all
users as proposed in [5].
The model in [5] is similar to that in [85]. The users as
bidders submit bids including their optimal power requests to
the base station as the seller. The optimal power requests of
users are determined similar to those in [85]. Upon receiving
the bids, the base station allocates power to users according to
the share auction, i.e., the proportional allocation, as presented
in [46]. However, the price that the user pays is proportional to
its power request and inversely proportional to the probability
of the user being malicious. This payment scheme will force
the malicious users to act as regular users in the network.
The simulation results showed that the additional cost for the
malicious user decreases when the probability that the user
performs a malicious action decreases. However, in practice,
the malicious users may continuously observe the network and
update their degree of maliciousness to maximize the harm to
the regular users while minimizing the detection probability.
C. Black Hole Attack
A black hole problem is actually a misbehavior routing
problem [90] in which one malicious node uses the same
routing protocol as the regular nodes, but it drops the routed
packets and does not forward the packets to its neighbors.
The traditional approaches using the punishment mechanism
such as CONFIDANT protocol [91] were proposed to assure
routing security and fairness. However, the approaches still
cannot eliminate the malicious nodes completely. By observing
that a selfish node in the network always desires to receive
the higher reputation than other nodes, an efficient solution
is to make the node compete for the reputation with others
through forwarding incoming packets. As a result, competitive
approaches such as auction or non-cooperative game are used.
The authors in [17] investigated a secure sensor network
routing protocol by using the first-price sealed-bid auction
to eliminate malicious sensors. This auction is used since it
requires little communication or interaction among the sensors.
A source sensor as a seller selects a secure route which is
formed by other sensors, i.e., bidders, to forward packets to
its destination. The secure route is required to not include any
malicious node that attempts to drop incoming packets. First,
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Fig. 9. Secure routing protocol based on auction.
the source sensor broadcasts a route request to its neighbors
as shown in Fig. 9. Then, the neighbors forward this request
to others. The destination may receive several requests and
confirms with the source by sending a reply message including
the bids. Each bid represents a route and contains the sum of
utilities of all sensors on the route. Here, the utility of a sensor
is a function of its remaining power and reputation. The source
selects the route which has the highest bid as the winner for
its data transmission. The sensors on the winning route pay
the source sensor a percentage of the initial power and receive
a good reputation as the reward. Since the sensors on a route
want to receive the high reputation from the source sensor,
they are motivated to cooperate to forward incoming packets.
The approach in [17] can mitigate the malicious sensors
causing the disruption to routing. However, it does not consider
the scenario in which some sensors could agree to join the
auction but will subvert the route later. A watch-list [92] which
records the sensors’ misbehavior can be used to recognize
such malicious sensors and then notify all other sensors to not
communicate with them. The simulation results in [17] showed
that the total number of dropped packets of the proposed
scheme is two-thirds less than that of the CONFIDANT
protocol [91]. The reason is that sensors with bad reputation
in the proposed scheme are ignored by the majority of sensors.
However, both proposed schemes, i.e., [17] and [92], do not
consider the case in which some sensors agree not to outbid
each other. This scenario has the overall effect of lowering the
winning bid and increasing the number of dropped packets.
Apart from the first-price sealed-bid auction, the Dutch
auction (as shown in Section III-B) can also be used to
address the back hole attack as proposed in [40]. The Dutch
auction is an appropriate solution since it can (i) provide
users sufficient incentives due to its payment policy and (ii)
guarantee that the malicious nodes can be quickly revoked
due to its simplicity. The model consists of honest nodes as
bidders, a trust authority as the auctioneer, and a malicious
node as the item. The bidders use Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) to collect evidence of malicious behavior, i.e., the non-
forwarding of packets, of suspicious neighbor nodes. Each
bidder has its own private value for the suspicious node which
is the risk appetite to revoke the suspicious node. The risk
appetite is defined as “1-desired certainty in revoking the
suspicious node” and depends on the accuracy of the IDS. The
bidder which takes the highest risk and revokes the suspicious
node earliest is known as the winner and receives a reward
for its effort by the trust authority. The winner’s profit is
the difference between its private value and the price quoted
in the auction. The simulation results showed that when the
IDS has a higher detection probability, the malicious node is
revoked after fewer auction rounds. However, the probability
of revoking the malicious node significantly lowers when the
number of bidders decreases since the competition among
bidders is low.
The Dutch auction can be combined with the reverse auction
to enforce the cooperation among nodes in a MANET as
proposed in [93]. In the network model under consideration,
a pair of source and destination nodes are buyers, and inter-
mediate nodes in the network are sellers. The source sends
a routing request to the intermediate nodes to forward its
packet to the destination node. Upon receiving the routing
request from the source node, the intermediate nodes reply
with their prices. The source node uses the reverse auction
to select an intermediate node with the lowest price as the
forwarding node. If the forwarding node is not in the list of
the neighbors of the destination node, the forwarding node
adopts the Dutch auction to sell the packet forwarding service
to the next hop node. Note that the proposed scheme uses the
Markov chain to predict the trust of nodes in the network. Thus
the source and forwarding nodes can check the trust levels of
their neighbor nodes. Finally, the total cost is paid by both
the source and destination nodes. This enforces both of them
to behave truthfully and prevent them from generating false
routing request flooding. To provide incentives, the forwarding
node receives the virtual currency which can be used to
forward its own packet in future. Simultaneously, the trust
level of the forwarding node is increased.
The proposed schemes in [40] and [93] require centralized
entities, e.g., the trust authority, which may not be available
in infrastructure-less networks such as MANETs. Fully dis-
tributed schemes using the mean field game theory can be
applied as proposed in [94]. Such a scheme enables each
node to make defense strategies based on only its own state
information, i.e., a combination of its energy and information
assets, and the aggregate effect of the other nodes.
Summary: This section discusses the applications of eco-
nomic and pricing models for the DoS attack prevention.
The reviewed approaches aim to provide resource pricing
mechanisms such that the users do not have any incentive
to perform their attack actions. We have considered three
common types of DoS attacks. The reviewed approaches along
with their references are summarized in Table VII. As seen,
the DDoS attacks have received more attentions because they
are more serious and common than the other types of attacks.
However, the pricing models developed for preventing the DoS
attacks in overall are relatively few. The next section reviews
the applications of economic and pricing models to enhance
the information security, i.e., privacy preserving and integrity.
VI. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
As discussed in Section IV, attackers are easier to perform
monitoring and eavesdropping communication links between
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TABLE VII
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST DOS ATTACKS (CN: CELLULAR NETWORK, MANET: MOBILE AD HOC
NETWORK, WSN: WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK)
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
Ja
m
m
in
g
at
ta
ck [15]
General
pricing
Legitimate
users
Legitimate
users
Free-
jamming
links
Each buyer pays the seller with a price based on
the marginal decrease of the sum-utility of the
other buyers due to the buyer’s strategy.
Total utility improvement,
and network traffic increase
A feasible
and
stationary
solution
MANET
[16]
Linear
pricing
Energy
supplier Adversary Power
Given the power price, the buyer determines its
optimal power, and then the source finds its
transmit power for the secrecy rate guarantee.
Secrecy rate guarantee, and
energy efficiency
Nash
equilibrium MANET
D
is
tr
ib
ut
ed
D
oS
at
ta
ck
[33]
Non-
cooperative
game
Base
station Users Power
The best response power allocation for buyers
depends on their private types and is obtained by
using the Crammer’s rule.
PoM reduction, and
rate-QoS satisfaction
Nash
equilibrium CN
[85]
Utility maxi-
mization
Base
station Users Power
Based on the probabilistic information of buyers’
behaviors, the seller finds the optimal power
allocation for the buyers using the Lagrange
multiplier method.
PoM reduction, and buyes’
utility maximization
Optimal
solution CN
[95]
Utility maxi-
mization
Base
station Users Power
Same as [85], but the Gaussian process
regression learning technique is used.
PoM reduction, and buyes’
utility maximization
Optimal
solution CN
[5] Shareauction
Base
station Users Power
Seller allocates the power to buyers according to
the share auction in [46]. Each buyer pays the
seller the price which is inversely proportional to
the probability of the buyer being malicious.
Malicious behavior
minimization, and buyes’
utility maximization
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
CN
B
la
ck
ho
le
at
ta
ck [17]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Source
sensor
Forwarding
sensors Reputation
Seller selects the route with the highest total
utility of buyers as the winner.
Secure routing
improvement
Nash
equilibrium WSN
[92]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Source
sensor
Forwarding
sensors Reputation
Same as [17], but the watch-list is used to
monitor and update the misbehavior of buyers.
Secure routing
improvement
Nash
equilibrium WSN
[40]
Dutch
auction
Trust
authority
Honest
nodes
Malicious
node
The buyer which takes the highest risk appetite
and revokes the suspicious node earliest is the
winner and gets a reward.
Optimal revocation of
malicious node
Nash
equilibrium MANET
TABLE VIII
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST DOS ATTACKS
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[15] • Provide a distributed solution • Support only one jammer
[33] • Provide a distributed solution and support multiple malicious and selfish users • Require learning techniques
[5] • Achieve centralized decisions on both power and price • Be challenging to infer the utilities of users
[17] • Have low overhead communication • Do not record misbehaviors of malicious sensors
[40] • Be simple to be implemented and revoke quickly malicious nodes • Require IDSs and the trust authority
regular users if the attackers have full knowledge of the
locations of the regular users in the network. In realistic envi-
ronments, when the locations of legitimate users are revealed,
they would have a high risk from physical attacks by the
adversaries. Thus it is of the great importance to investigate
the location privacy which refers to the ability of preventing
the adversaries from learning the regular users’ current or
past locations [96]. This section reviews economic and pricing
approaches to address the user information privacy leakage
issue. In particular for the wireless environments, the two
following scenarios are considered.
• Privacy leakage in sensing data collection: In the sensing
data collection, sensors or phone users perform sensing
in an area of interest and submit the data to the central
controllers for further processing. However, the collected
sensing data may include location information which
reveals sensitive information, e.g., home address and
identifiers of the users. Economic and pricing models are
developed and integrated with cryptographic algorithms
to obtain sensing data with high quality and low cost
while protecting the users’ privacy [25].
• Privacy leakage in spectrum allocation: In the spectrum
allocation, users which are located far enough from each
other can be allocated the same spectrum without causing
interference with each other. Thus they are required to
submit their location information when requesting the
spectrum. This naturally reveals the users’ location in-
formation. The combination of pricing models and cryp-
tographic algorithms can support efficient and privacy-
preserving spectrum allocation for the users.
A. Privacy leakage in sensing data collection
A sensing data collection process can be implemented
through a WSN or a Mobile Crowdsensing Network (MCN).
Both of them perform gathering sensing data from interest
areas. However, the WSN is typically composed of a large
number of autonomous and resource-limited sensors to collect
the data. On the contrary, the MCN explores the data from
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Fig. 10. Sensing data collection based on the reverse Vickrey auction.
mobile devices, e.g., smartphones, of users [25]. As a result,
the security issue in the WSN is typically the misbehavior
routing such as black hole attack while that in the MCN is
the physical attack due to the users’ privacy leakage. The
black hole attack in the WSN was addressed by pricing models
combined with misbehavior detection schemes as presented in
Section V-C. This section discusses pricing models integrated
with cryptographic method to prevent the privacy leakage for
users in the MCN.
A typical data aggregation model in the MCN is shown in
Fig. 10 which consists of a server and participants, i.e., mobile
users. One of the most common approaches used in the model
is the reverse auction [25]. The main motivations of using
such auction are to (i) reduce the incentive cost, (ii) achieve
high quality data, (iii) prevent bidders from knowing bids of
each other through simultaneous sealed bid submission, and
(iv) provide incentives to the users for contributing their data.
The basic data aggregation based on the sealed-bid reverse
auction works as follows. The server as an auctioneer first
broadcasts the sensing task description from customers to all
mobile users, i.e., sellers. Interested users accept and perform
the sensing task. Upon completing the sensing task, the users
submit their asking prices including the sensing data and the
prices to the server. The server selects the users with the lowest
asking prices as the winners and makes the payments to them.
In fact, the auctioneer selects the winners based on not only
their asking prices, but also the areas where the users perform
sensing tasks. For example, if users are closer to the area of
interest, their sensing data is likely to be more useful and thus
has higher utility. As such, the users have more opportunities
to become the winners. In this scenario, the users are often
required to specify their locations along with the asking prices.
This leads to the location information leakage of the users.
Even worse, there may be attackers in the network which harm
the users. To preserve the location information, users only
submit their asking prices with obscure locations as proposed
in [97]. After the asking process, the winning users reveal their
actual locations when submitting the sensing data. However,
utility of the auctioneer in this case can be hampered since it
cannot evaluate the actual utility of the sensing data without
having the knowledge of users’ accurate locations. This makes
the auctioneer overpay or underpay for the received sensing
data.
In practice, even if the users’ locations are obscure, the
attacker or auctioneer can infer the users’ locations from the
asking prices. Indeed, a user closer to the area of interest
usually evaluates its sensing data at high utility, thus setting
the higher asking price than that of the others. From the
asking price together with the knowledge of interest area, the
attacker or auctioneer can infer the user’s location. In [98],
the auctioneer broadcasts the payment for sensing data that
are collected at a specific location. Based on the payment
information, each participant decides whether to upload the
data or not. There is no asking price submission, and this
reduces the risk of privacy leakage to the attacker. However,
the asking price is still revealed to the auctioneer. Therefore,
the price privacy needs to be preserved. In [99], the asks are
encrypted before being submitted using the Time Lapse Cryp-
tography (TLC) which provides the computation efficiency
and correctness. Moreover, before being transmitted to the
auctioneer, the asks are signed electronically by the users
by employing the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme [100] to
keep the confidentiality of the asks. The auctioneer determines
the winners based on the encrypted asks rather than their real
ones. Specifically, the users which have the encrypted asks
lower than a payment threshold are selected as the winners
to provide sensing data. The payment threshold influences
the outcome of the auction. However, how to determine the
threshold was not explained.
The same approach can be found in [101], but a gen-
eral auction was adopted to provide online privacy-aware
incentives to users. In this model, users as sellers come and
submit their asks for a sensing task sequentially requested
by a platform, i.e., the buyer. First, using TLC, each user
encrypts its asking price, sensing time, and pseudonym with
the platform’s public key. The user then makes and signs a
commitment and sends its bidding request to the platform.
Given the requests, the platform determines the winner based
on the user’s past reputation and marginal utility, i.e., the utility
gained from using the sensing data, by applying the platform
decryption key. A reject or accept decision is encrypted and
signed before being sent to the users. If a user is accepted, it
starts its sensing task. The sensing data is encrypted and signed
before being submitted to the platform. If the data is trustable,
the platform increases the reputation for the user as a reward.
Otherwise, the platform decreases the user’s reputation as the
punishment. The reputation punishment makes the proposed
mechanism truthful. As shown in the simulation results, the
number of trustful users can get to a stable status after
10 transactions, each of which is defined as the interaction
between the user and the platform in a task. However, some
users can accumulate reputations in some transactions and
then behave unreliably in later transactions. Thus the malicious
fluctuation problem of users needs to be further investigated.
The general auction was also adopted in [102] to provide
privacy-aware incentives and fairness for the users. The model
consists of a campaigner as a buyer, an auctioneer, and users
as sellers. Each user submits an ask to the auctioneer including
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its asking price, true value, and location information. The auc-
tioneer clusters the users into crowds, each of which satisfies
the spatial-price approximation, i.e., the total difference in
asking prices and locations among users in the same crowd is
minimum, and the k-anonymity location privacy, i.e., a user
cannot be distinguished from the location information of at
least (k − 1) other users in the same crowd. The auctioneer
then employs the bargaining game [103] to bargain with the
campaigner on a deal price for each crowd. The objective aims
at maximizing the product of the crowd’s and the campaigner’s
utility gains. The auctioneer allocates the deal price to the
users. The payment for each user is inversely proportional to
the difference between its asking price and its true value. Such
a payment encourages the users to submit asking prices close
to their true valuation. As shown in the simulation results,
although users in the same crowd have different asking prices,
their payments are almost the same, i.e., the fairness among
the users is achieved.
Similar to [102], the user anonymity and fairness issues
were also considered in [104], but the sealed-bid multi-
attribute reverse auction was employed. The sealed-bid multi-
attribute reverse auction is similar to the reserve auction, but
the former allows the auctioneer to evaluate an ask based on
more attributes in addition to the price. More specifically, the
attributes of an ask are the price, the location accuracy, and the
sampling frequency. These attributes are converted to the ask
utility score through the linear utility function used in [105].
The asks are encrypted by using the Paillier cryptosystem
[23] before being submitted to the auctioneer. The auctioneer
then adopts the private set intersection algorithm [106] for
determining the winner. The proposed algorithm does not need
to open asks while still achieving the winner determination and
the public verifiability. The public verifiability is provided by
the use of the bulletin board which allows anybody to check
the identities of sellers and confirm whether their asks are
valid or not. Thus the strong ask privacy is maintained during
the auction. According to the security analysis, the proposed
scheme satisfies the security requirements of an electronic
auction, e.g., anonymity, ask privacy, and public verifiability.
The same approaches can be found in [107]. However,
instead of using the Paillier cryptosystem, the authors in
[107] masked each seller’s ask with a hash value which is
computed from a random number. The one-wayness property
of the hash function ensures that the sellers’ asks remain
hidden. This eliminates the possibility that a seller or the
auctioneer can divulge information about the others throughout
the asking process. As a result, the confidentiality of asks is
better maintained compared to [104]. The winners are then
determined similar to [104]. Note that to increase the winning
opportunities for the losers in the next rounds, the proposed
scheme in [107] includes the number of previously lost auction
rounds as one attribute when evaluating the asks.
Different from [107], the authors in [108] used a key
generator which randomly generates and distributes a series of
polynomial values and IDs for the participants. Then, by lever-
aging the tools such as the Lagrange polynomial interpolation
and fixed point representation, the auctioneer determines the
winners and their corresponding payments without leaking the
ask privacy of participants to any of the other parts including
itself. Note that the payments for the winners are based on
the VCG payment policy to guarantee the truthfulness of the
asks.
In addition to the sellers’ privacy preserving, the authors
in [109] considered the power consumption and the history
participation of the sellers. The proposed approach is es-
sentially the first-price sealed-bid reverse auction. However,
the ask evaluation is similar to the sealed-bid multi-attribute
reverse auction. Accordingly, once receiving the sensing data
requirement from the auctioneer, i.e., a data sink, sellers
generate their own asks. The seller’s ask is calculated based on
its true value, its current power level, the number of auction
rounds that the seller has participated. In particular, if the
seller performs sensing frequently, i.e., the large number of
auction rounds, the seller should receive a higher incentive
to compensate the loss of the seller’s location information
associated with its data transfered to the sink. Based on the
asks, the sink selects a predefined number of sellers with the
lowest asks as the winners. The simulation results showed that
when the predefined number is very high, i.e., 100, the average
inter-win bid time of the proposed scheme, which is defined
as the average number of ticks that elapsed between two wins
for a given node, of a seller is low since the sellers with low
privacy concern are selected frequently. Whereas this value of
the baseline [110] changes only slightly which implies that
the baseline cannot be calibrated to meet different privacy
requirements.
Apart from the privacy concerns in crowdsensing networks,
the privacy for drivers in Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC)
has recently been considered. The VCC combines the benefits
of Mobile Cloud Computing and vehicular communications.
In the VCC, drivers can access cloud services, e.g., processing
services, from Service Providers (SPs). However, this may
lead to disclosure of the drivers’ personal information, such
as location, identifiers, and routine, to the SPs or attackers.
Therefore, the authors in [111] proposed a lightweight auction
to provide cloud services which guarantee the low service cost,
low service delay, and minimum amount of the information
revealed to the SPs, while guaranteeing privacy preserving.
The model consists of drivers as bidders, Trusted Third Parties
(TTPs) as brokers, and SPs as sellers. Generally, the drivers
submit the service requests along with the Quality of Experi-
ence (QoE) requirements to the TTPs. The QoE is expressed as
a weighted function of delay, service cost, and privacy. Then,
each TTP adopts the auction to select the best set of drivers
to maximize the TTP’s profit while meeting the drivers’ QoE
requirements. Similarly, each SP employs the auction model
to select the best set of TTPs to maximize the SP’s profit.
Under the proposed solution, the profits of all parties will be
maximized. In particular, the privacy preserving for the drivers
is guaranteed through their QoE requirements
B. Privacy leakage in spectrum allocation
An efficient spectrum allocation scheme ensures that spec-
trum resource is assigned to the users which can use the re-
source most valuably. Auctions are among the most promising
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methods to achieve this objective since they always maintain
the competition among users [112], and further raising impor-
tant sums of money for spectrum providers, i.e., the sellers. In
spectrum auction, users act as bidders submit their bids to an
auctioneer or a seller. Each bid contains information about a
specific channel and the price that the user is willing to pay.
Based on the bids, the auctioneer assigns the channels to the
users and charges them according to which specific auction
scheme is used.
Note that in the spectrum auction, the same channel can
be sold to multiple non-interfering users. As such, the users
are required to provide their location information, in addi-
tion to their bids, to the auctioneer to construct the conflict
constraints. This increases the location information leakage of
users. In fact, the risk can also come indirectly from the bid
submission of the users. For example, based on the channel
specified in a bid of the user, an attacker can acquire a set
of possible cells of the user by intersecting the complements
of different seller’s coverages [113]. Additionally, the price
included in the bid can also increase the location leakage of the
user. Indeed, bidding prices of the user for different channels
typically imply the different channel quality estimations. The
attacker can compute the difference between the estimated
quality from the user and the real quality from a geo-location
database in each candidate cell. The cell with minimum
distance is regarded as the user’s position. In summary, the
location information and bids of users need to be protected in
spectrum auctions. The following reviews privacy preserving
approaches to address this issue. For convenience, they are
classified according to the structure of the market that are the
single-sided auction, i.e., one seller and multiple buyers, and
the double-sided auction, i.e., multiple sellers and multiple
buyers.
1) Single-sided auction: The pioneering work can be found
in [114] which is a two-stage privacy preserving scheme to
address the location and bid leakage issue for Secondary Users
(SUs) in the spectrum auction in Cognitive Radio Networks
(CRNs). The model consists of a Trusted Third Party (TTP),
an auctioneer as a spectrum owner, i.e., a seller, and SUs
as bidders. The first stage focuses on the location and bid
privacy preserving based on the TTP’s secret keys which use
the keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). The
keys are known only by the SUs and the TTP. For the location
privacy, each SU calculates its HMAC value based on its loca-
tion and interference range. Then, the SUs submit the values
to the auctioneer so that the auctioneer determines whether the
SUs would interfere with each other. Similar to the bid privacy,
the SU calculates its HMAC value for each channel bid, and
then submits its HMAC value to the auctioneer. Based on the
values, the auctioneer determines the winner for each channel
using the prefix membership verification scheme [115]. The
auctioneer then assigns channels to the winners through a
greedy spectrum allocation. In the second stage, the auctioneer
delivers the masked winning bids encrypted by the symmetric
key generated by the TTP and the corresponding prefix sets to
the TTP. The TTP decrypts these bids to obtain their plaintext
and then sends the plaintext back to the auctioneer so as to
securely charge the winners. The simulation results showed
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Fig. 11. Bid privacy preserving with the help of the agent/TTP.
that the proposed scheme reduces the location information
leakage of the user from 20% to 60% compared to that in the
case without using any privacy preserving. However, the use
of the TTP increases the communication overhead which can
affect real-time applications. Moreover, the proposed scheme
did not consider the truthfulness of the auction.
The authors in [116] designed a spectrum auction by consid-
ering both the truthfulness and privacy preserving. The model
is shown in Fig. 11 which consists of an auctioneer, i.e., the
seller, a trustworthy authority which acts as an intermediate
agent, and mobile users as bidders, i.e., buyers. The main idea
is to separate the information known by the auctioneer and
the agent such that no party has enough information to infer
any sensitive information. The proposed auction is performed
in three stages. In the first stage, bidders submit their bids
based on their channel valuations to the agent. The agent
uses the Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) [24] to map
the bids to another value while preserving the order of the
bids. In the second stage, each bidder encrypts its value using
the auctioneer’s public key through an asymmetric encryption
function. The bidder submits a tuple as an encrypted bid to
the agent which includes its encrypted value and a signing
function. The agent divides the bidders into non-conflicting
groups, i.e., non-interfering groups, and publishes the grouping
result and encrypted bids. In the third stage, the auctioneer
decrypts the bids, calculates the prices representing for groups
of bidders, and sorts the groups in a non-increasing order of
their prices. The first K-bidder groups are the winners, and
each winning bidder group is charged with a group bid of the
(K + 1)st group. This charging scheme enables the auction
to achieve the truthfulness. The charge is then shared evenly
among group members, i.e., bidders.
The same approach can be found in [117]. However, the
Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem involving the bilinear
map and bilinear group [118] was used instead of the OPE
to map and encrypt the bids. The simulation results in [117]
showed that the satisfaction ratio, i.e., the percentage of
winning bidders, of the proposed scheme can reach to one
with the small number of bidders, i.e., less than 200. However,
there is no numerical experiment to show the performance
improvement related to the strategy-proofness as well as the
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privacy preserving. Moreover, the collusion between the agent
and the auctioneer, as well as that among bidders, were
also not mentioned. In fact, the 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer
protocol [119] can be used to encrypt the exchange messages
between the bidders and the agent. This protocol prevents the
agent from knowing the chosen bids. Otherwise, the secure
multi-party computation [120] can be applied to allow the
bidders in the same group to find the smallest bid for verifying
the auction outcome while preserving the privacy of their bids.
By selecting the smallest bid as the representation bid of a
non-conflict group, the approach in [117] allows the bidders
in the group to receive more benefit since they only pay less
price than their expected bids. However, such a low price
causes a loss in revenue for the seller. The authors in [121]
combined the concept of the differential privacy with the
spectrum auction in CRNs to preserve the privacy for bidders
while obtaining approximately revenue maximization for the
seller. The differential privacy aims to reveal information about
the population as a whole, while protecting the privacy of each
individual. The model involves several SUs as buyers, i.e., bid-
ders, and one PU as the seller. The proposed scheme consists
of three stages, i.e., grouping, price determination, and winner
selection. The grouping stage divides the bidders into non-
conflicting groups using the graph coloring algorithms [122].
Then, the price determination stage sets the probability of the
final price of each group which is exponentially proportional
to the seller’s corresponding revenue. The revenue of each
group is calculated based on the final price and the number of
bidders in the group. The winner selection stage selects groups
with the highest revenues as the winners and allocates them
the channels.
It is worth noting that the pricing strategy in [121] can
achieve good differential privacy for bidders’ bids. This means
that any change in a bidder’s bid will not significantly change
the revenue of the bidder’s group, and thus the others cannot
infer information of this particular bidder just from the rev-
enues. In practice, a bidder can request more channels in the
auction. In this scenario, the solution in [117] can be applied.
However, the bidder is first represented by elementary bidders,
and each elementary bidder can be considered to be a buyer
which requests one channel. The seller then divides the non-
conflict groups based on these elementary bidders. Note that
the elementary bidders belonging to the same bidder cannot
use the same channel since they cause interference to each
other. Finally, the solution in [117] can be directly applied.
Apart from employing the OPE as proposed in [116], the
ElGamal encryption function [123] can be used to preserve bid
privacy for SUs in CRNs as proposed in [124]. The ElGamal
encryption function has the same homomorphic property as the
Paillier cryptosystem mentioned in [104]. The model consists
of an auctioneer, a Cryptographic Authority (CA), a PU as
the seller, and SUs as bidders. The proposed scheme has
five stages as shown in Fig. 12 in which the first one is
similar to the grouping stage in [121]. In the second stage,
each bidder generates a sealed bidding vector to conceal its
actual bid using the homomorphic encryption generated by the
CA. The bidders then submit their vectors to the auctioneer
via a secure channel employing the auctioneer’s public key.
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Fig. 12. Privacy preserving protocol for bidders with the help of the CA.
In the third stage, the auctioneer constructs a mixed sealed
group matrix from the sealed bidding vectors for each group
using the homomorphic property. A random number is also
introduced in the matrix to prevent the leakage of sensitive
information. The auctioneer then sends all matrices of the
groups to the CA with fake group identities. In the forth stage,
the CA decrypts the minimal bid in each group by using the
binary search tree algorithm [125] without requiring the other
bid information in the group. Based on these minimal bids,
the CA determines group bids, the winning groups, and their
charges similar to those in [116]. Note that winning groups are
charged by the same price, i.e., the uniform clearing price. In
the fifth stage, the CA sends the set of winning groups with
fake identities and the clearing price to the auctioneer. The
auctioneer transforms the fake identities into the true ones and
announces the winning groups along with the clearing price
to all the bidders.
It can be observed that in [124], since the homomorphic
encryption key is generated by the CA, the auctioneer is unable
to decrypt the sealed bidding vectors. On the other hand,
the bidders send their sealed bidding vectors by using the
public key of the auctioneer which will prevent the CA from
eavesdropping. Therefore, the proposed scheme guarantees
that no sensitive information other than group bids is exposed
as long as the auctioneer and CA do not collude with each
other. However, by generating the ciphertext for every possible
price, the communication overhead of bidders is extremely
high. As shown in the simulation results, when the number
of possible prices equals 1000, the communication overhead
of the proposed approach is around 62.5KB while that of the
no-privacy-preserving spectrum auction scheme [126] is only
0.001KB.
2) Double-sided auction: To protect the users’ location
information, another possible technique is the k-anonymity
location privacy [127]. With the k-anonymity location privacy,
user’s location information is k-anonymous, meaning that the
user cannot be distinguished from the location information of
at least (k − 1) other users. To provide k-anonymity location
privacy, it is required to have an anonymity set consisting of
at least k users. However, some users may not be sensitive
about their own location information, and they may have no
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incentive to participate in the anonymity set. When there are
not enough privacy-sensitive users in the anonymity set, the
privacy-sensitive users can act as buyers and invite users which
are not sensitive to privacy, i.e., sellers, to participate.
To provide the sellers incentives to take part in the
anonymity set while achieving some economic properties such
as the balanced budget, truthfulness, and high satisfaction
ratio, the authors in [44] adopted the double auction to
model the interaction between the buyers, the sellers, and an
auctioneer, i.e., a central authority. The number of buyers is
assumed to be less than k and to have the same privacy degree
requirements. The proposed approach consists of two stages.
In the first stage, the buyers submit to the auctioneer their bids,
i.e., bidding prices that they are willing to pay. Simultaneously,
the sellers submit to the auctioneer their asks, i.e., asking
prices that they agree to participate in the anonymity. The
auctioneer then sorts the buyers in a descending order of bids
and the sellers in an ascending order of asks. The auctioneer
finds the largest index x at which the sum of bids of x buyers is
not less than the sum of asks of (k−x) sellers. This is to satisfy
the balanced budget property of the auction. The x first buyers
and the (k − x) first sellers are the winners. In the second
stage, the charges for the winning buyers and the payments
for the winning sellers are determined according to the ask of
(k−x+1)th seller. This pricing strategy guarantees the truth-
fulness of the proposed scheme. The simulation results also
showed that the proposed scheme outperforms the baseline in
[128] in terms of the satisfaction ratio, i.e., the percentage of
buyers winning the auction. However, the auctioneer’s profit
in the proposed approach is zero or negative in some cases.
The truthful double auction can also be found in [129] which
addressed the privacy preserving for users in the spectrum
allocation. In this model, the users which act as buyers, i.e.,
bidders, buy channels from the other users, i.e., sellers, via
an auctioneer and an auction agent. The proposed algorithm
includes three steps. The first step forms non-conflict groups of
the bidders as implemented in [116]. The agent publishes the
public key based on the Paillier cryptosystem to the auctioneer
and the bidders. The bidders use the public key to map their
bids to Encrypted Bit Vectors (EBVs). In the second step, the
bidders submit the EBVs to the auctioneer. The auctioneer
uses the homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem
to find the minimum EBV bid and compute the EBV group
bid without the knowledge of the bidders’ bids. Then, the
auctioneer finds (i) the encrypted bidder group index with the
highest group bid, and (ii) the seller index with the lowest
ask. The two indexes are sent to the agent which performs
the decryption to obtain actual indexes. The agent sends the
decrypted information back to the auctioneer. If the highest
group bid is not less than the lowest ask, the corresponding
bidder group and the seller are the winners. This process is
repeated for the remaining bidder groups and sellers. The
group bid and the ask obtained in the last iteration of the
process are the buying and selling clearing prices, respectively.
In the third step, each bidder in the winning bidder group pays
the equal share of the buying clearing price.
The proposed algorithm in [129] achieves the correctness,
meaning that the double auction result is the same as the result
of double auctions without the cryptosystem. However, it has
three shortcomings. First, it does not consider the privacy
preservation of sellers’ asks. Second, the ranking orders of
the winning sellers’ asks and the winning buyer group’s bids
are leaked to both the auctioneer and the agent, i.e., the
proposed algorithm is not really secure. Third, the efficiency
of the proposed algorithm is not satisfactory in terms of time
complexity. As shown in the simulations, when the number of
sellers is 30, and that of buyers is 70, the total time to receive
the final result is 80 minutes, which is unacceptable.
The first shortcoming can be simply solved by applying
the Paillier cryptosystem to the asks as proposed in [130].
The second shortcoming can be addressed by hiding the
ranking orders of winners. One possible solution is that the
auctioneer uses the set of randomized sellers and the set of
randomized buyers instead of the original ones. Thus when
the agent sends actual indexes of a bidder group-seller pair
to the auctioneer, the auctioneer does not know which pair is.
For the third shortcoming, the Batcher’s sorting network [131]
can be used to limit the number of bidder groups and sellers
before matching each bidder group’s bid and each seller’s ask
as proposed in [132].
C. Bid Integrity for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
The bid privacy preserving schemes as discussed in Sec-
tions VI-A and VI-B are always performed in networks in
which central management entities such as the TTP and the
auctioneer are easily deployed. However, in infrastructure-less
networks such as MANET, the schemes are almost infeasible
due to the absence of central management entities. Thus bids
are easily revealed, modified, or damaged during the bidding
process. Indeed, to develop an auction process in the MANET,
a bidder can submit its bid directly to a seller. If the bidder
cannot communicate directly with the seller, it asks another
bidder as a router to forward its bid to the seller. When
forwarding the bid, a malicious bidder can modify the bid
of a rival bidder if the bid is not protected. Therefore, the bid
integrity which ensures that the bidder’s bid is not modified
or damaged during transmission needs to be considered.
The authors in [133] investigated the bid integrity issue
for the English auction in MANET. The model is shown in
Fig. 13 in which the initiator acts as a seller which trades a
resource unit, and network nodes, i.e., bidders, compete on
the resource. In the English auction, the seller initially sets
the lowest price of the resources and increases the price in
the next rounds. The auction terminates if there is no new
higher price submitted, and the bidder with the highest bid
wins the resource. To guarantee the integrity of the bids,
the Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold cryptography scheme [134] was
used. Accordingly, a private key is shared among n bidders
in such a way that no single bidder can recover the private
key without the cooperation of (k − 1) other bidders. One
example is shown in Fig. 13. The source bidder first shares
its private key with n one-hop neighbors, and then sends its
bid to these neighbors in unicast messages encrypted with
the neighbors’ public keys. Each neighbor signs the received
bid with its own secret key which is generated based on
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Fig. 13. Bid’s integrity in MANET based on the (k, n)-threshold cryptog-
raphy scheme. Bid(pk1) is the source bidder’s bid encrypted with neighbor
1’s public key, and bid(sk1) is the source bidder’s bid signed with neighbor
1’s secret key.
the source bidder’s private key. The neighbors then flood the
signed bids to all bidders in the network. Given the property
of the (k, n)-threshold cryptography, a bidder which wants to
recover the original bid of the source bidder must receive at
least k versions of the bid with k different secret keys.
Apart from guaranteeing the bid integrity, the bidding
process in [133] needs to prevent a network attack which
commonly occurs in the bid forwarding, called replay or
playback attack. In the replay attack, a malicious bidder
intercepts the bids from the others and submits them again in
a future auction round [135]. Thus the malicious bidder may
be considered to be a legitimate bidder, but then it disturbs
the routing/forwarding operation in the network. To prevent
the replay attack, the authors in [136] added a so-called nonce
in each bid. In cryptography, a nonce is an arbitrary number
which may only be used once. The nonce in each bid is
generally calculated based on the identifier of the current
auction round and the private key of the corresponding bidder.
The nonce’s value is unique in each auction round and invalid
in other auction rounds. Thus a malicious bidder cannot reuse
another bidder’s bid in a next auction round. However, this
solution requires the initiator and each bidder to create and
manage an Access Control List (ACL) which contains the
identifiers of all bidders in the network. The ACL also needs
to be updated when a bidder joins or leaves the network. This
significantly increases communication overhead.
Summary: This section discusses privacy preserving mech-
anisms for users through integrating encryption methods with
pricing models. The reviewed approaches along with their
references are summarized in Table IX. We observe that
almost all the approaches investigate the integration of auc-
tion schemes with cryptographic algorithms to protect the
information privacy for bidders. Also, the spectrum allocation
receives more attentions than the sensing data collection. In
fact, the spectrum allocation also faces other security issues
which severely deteriorate the efficiency of the allocation. The
security issues commonly arise from the cheating and illegiti-
mate behaviors of users in the network, i.e., the collusion and
the false-name bid cheating. The following section reviews the
pricing approaches to deal with these issues.
VII. ILLEGITIMATE BEHAVIORS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
This section reviews applications of pricing models to pre-
vent the following illegitimate behaviors in spectrum auctions.
• Collusion: In spectrum auctions, the bidders may collude
with each other through coordinating their bids which
suppresses the competition for spectrum resources. The
low competition degrades the spectrum efficiency as well
as the seller’s revenue. To prevent the collusion, the
system approach, e.g., [137], can be applied. However
the system approach is considered to be the "hard"
approach that requires additional hardware and software
to implement and enforce it. This can incur substantial
cost and overhead. More importantly, since the users still
have interest to collude, they can adapt and find any flaw
in the system approach to successfully make a collusion.
Conversely, the economic approach is considered to be
the "soft" approach that motivates and incentivizes the
users not to make collusion as it is not profitable for them
to do so. Therefore, the economic approach is natural and
inherent in the decision making of the users, thus more
efficient and more effective to employ.
• False-name bids: A single bidder can increase its utility
by submitting false bids made under multiple fictitious
identifiers. This may lead to a severe loss in revenue for
the seller. Pricing models are adopted to guarantee that a
bidder cannot increase its utility with false-name bids.
A. User Collusion and Bid-rigging
The authors in [138] adopted the Vickrey auction with the
aim of improving the utility of a Primary User (PU), i.e.,
the seller, in the presence of the collusion among Secondary
Users (SUs), i.e., bidders, as shown in Fig. 14. First, the SUs
are divided into bidding rings, each of which is a collection
of bidders which collude in the auction. In each bidding
ring, the SU with the highest bid, called the effective SU,
represents the bidding ring. The PU selects the effective SU
with the highest bid as the winner. The reserve price for the
winner is determined to maximize the expected utility gain
of the PU. In particular, the gain is formulated based on the
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of the highest and
second highest bids of the effective SUs. Such pricing strategy
guarantees that the PU always receives a price greater than or
equal to the optimal reserve price, and thus its revenue is high.
The simulation results showed that given the same collusion
rate, the proposed algorithm outperforms the one without using
the reserve price in terms of the PU’s utility. However, how to
determine the bidding rings as well as the statistics, i.e., the
CDFs, of bids was not explained.
In fact, the solution in [138] can also be applied to the
scenario involving multiple PUs and one SU. In this case, the
PUs, i.e., the sellers, collude with each other to obtain higher
prices. Similar to the scenario with multiple SUs and one PU,
the PUs are first divided into the bidding rings. In each bidding
ring, the PU with the lowest price is selected as the effective
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TABLE IX
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR PRIVACY CONCERNS AND CONFIDENTIALITY (CN: CELLULAR NETWORK, MANET: MOBILE
AD HOC NETWORK, MCN: MOBILE CROWDSENSING NETWORK)
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
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[97]
Reverse
Vickrey
auction
Phone
users Platform
Sensing
data
Sellers submit their asking prices with obscure
locations. The buyer selects the winners with the
lowest asking prices.
Incentive compatibility,
revenue improvement,
and privacy preserving
Nash
equilibrium MCN
[99]
Reverse
Vickrey
auction
Phone
users Server
Real
identity
Sellers’ asks are encrypted by the TLC method and
signed by using the Nyberg-Rueppel signature
scheme. The sellers with asks lower than a
threshold are selected as the winners.
truthfulness, revenue
improvement, and
privacy preserving
Nash
equilibrium MCN
[101]
General
auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Same as [99], but the winner selection is based on
the past reputation and marginal utility of sellers.
truthfulness, efficiency,
and privacy preserving
Nash
equilibrium MCN
[102]
General
auction
Phone
users Campaigner
Sensing
data
The auctioneer clusters the sellers into crowds and
bargains with the buyer on the deal price for each
crowd using the bargaining game.
truthfulness, anonymity,
and fairness
Nash
bargaining
equilibrium
MCN
[104]
Multi-
attribute
reverse
auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Each ask is encrypted by Paillier cryptosystem.
The buyer determines the winner by using the
private set intersection algorithm.
Anonymity, public
verifiability, and fairness
Bayes-Nash
equilibrium MCN
[107]
Multi-
attribute
reverse
auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Each ask with multiple attributes corresponding to
a utility score is masked with a hash value. Sellers
with the highest scores are the winners.
Privacy preserving,
public verifiability, and
fairness
Bayes-Nash
equilibrium MCN
[109]
First-price
sealed-bid
reverse
auction
Phone
users Data sink
Sensing
data
Each seller’s ask is generated based on its power
level and a privacy function. The sellers with the
lowest asks are the winners.
Privacy preserving, and
energy balance
Nash
equilibrium MCN
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[114]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Spectrum
owner SUs Spectrum
Buyers’ bids are encrypted by the HMAC values
of the TTP. The auctioneer uses the prefix
membership verification to determine a winner.
Then, the auctioneer cooperates with the TTP to
securely charging the winner.
Privacy leakage
reduction, and
satisfaction ratio
improvement
Nash
equilibrium CRN
[116]
Vickrey
auction
Spectrum
supplier
Phone
users Spectrum
Buyers’ bids are encrypted by the agent’s OPE.
The auctioneer cooperates with the agent to
determine the winners and charges them according
to the second-price auction rule.
Privacy preserving,
satisfaction ratio
improvement, and
truthfulness
Nash
equilibrium CN
[117]
Vickrey
auction
Spectrum
supplier
Phone
users Spectrum
Same as [116], but the BGN cryptosystem is used
to encrypt the buyers’ bids.
Privacy preserving,
satisfaction ratio
improvement, and
truthfulness
Nash
equilibrium CN
[121]
General
sealed-bid
auction
PU SUs Spectrum
Seller applies the differential privacy to set the
probability of the final price of each buyer group
according to the seller’s revenue.
Differential privacy, and
seller’s revenue
maximization
Nash
equilibrium CRN
[124]
Vickrey
auction PU SUs Spectrum
Buyers’ bids are encrypted by the ElGamal
encryption function. The auctioneer constructs a
mixed sealed group matrix for each bid. The
auctioneer cooperates with the CA to determine
winning groups and their charges.
Privacy preserving,
truthfulness, and
spectrum utilization
efficiency
Nash
equilibrium CRN
[44]
Double
auction
Phone
users
Phone
users Participation
k winning buyers and winning sellers are
determined to satisfy the balanced budget. The
charge and the payment are identically set to
satisfy the truthfulness.
k-anonymous location
privacy, truthfulness,
balanced budget, and
satisfaction ratio
improvement
Market
equilibrium CN
[129]
Double
auction
Phone
users
Phone
users Spectrum
Buyers’ bids are encrypted using the Paillier
cryptosystem. The auctioneer cooperates with the
agent to determine winning bidder groups, i.e.,
winning bidders, winning sellers, and clearing
price.
Privacy preserving,
correctness, and
truthfulness
Market
equilibrium CN
[132]
Double
auction
Phone
users
Phone
users Spectrum
Same as [129], but the Batcher’s sorting network is
used to limit the number of asks and bids before
the winner determination process.
Privacy preserving,
correctness, and
efficiency
Market
equilibrium CN
B
id
in
te
gr
ity [133]
English
auction Initiator
Network
nodes
Network
resource
Steps are similar to those in an English auction,
but each buyer’s bid is encrypted by the
(k, n)-threshold cryptography.
Revenue improvement,
and bid integrity
Nash
equilibrium MANET
[136]
English
auction Initiator
Network
nodes
Network
resource
Same as [133], but the identifier of the current
auction round and the private key of each buyer
are included in buyer’s bid.
Revenue improvement,
bid integrity, fairness,
and replay attack
prevention
Nash
equilibrium MANET
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TABLE X
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR PRIVACY CONCERNS AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[114] • Preserve privacy for both location and bid price • Have high communication overhead
[116] • Achieve both privacy preserving and truthfulness
• Ignore the collusion between the auctioneer and the trustworthy authority
• Do not consider the loss in the seller’s revenue
[121] • Achieve privacy preserving and revenue maximization • Support reserving only a single channel for a buyer
[124] • Achieve both privacy preserving and truthfulness
• Ignore the collusion between the auctioneer and the cryptographic authority
• Have high overhead communication
[129]
• Support preserving privacy for multiple phone users
• Achieve privacy preserving and correctness • Have high time complexity and do not consider the ask privacy
[132]
• Support preserving privacy for multiple phone users
• Have low time complexity • Ignore the collusion among bidders
[133] • Be simple to be implemented • Do not guarantee the fairness among bidders
Bidding ring 
Effective 
SU (bidder)
PU
(seller) 
Bid Bid Bid
Fig. 14. Collusion-resistance based on the second-price sealed-bid auction.
PU which represents for the bidding ring. The SU formulates
its expected utility gain with the reserve price which it is
willing to pay for leasing the channel. The optimal reserve
price is then determined by taking the first-order derivative of
maximizing the expected utility gain.
Considering a more general scenario with multiple PUs
and multiple SUs, the authors in [139] adopted the double
auction to combat the collusion among the SUs and the
collusion among the PUs. This case can be considered to be the
combination of the two scenarios discussed in [138]. Thus the
optimal reserve price for each PU or SU can be determined
using the results in [138]. Additionally, to obtain the CDFs
of the effective SUs’ bids and the effective PUs’ asks, the
common belief functions at different prices of the PUs and
the SUs are constructed. The common belief function of the
PUs/SUs at a certain price is defined as the ratio of asks/bids
from the PUs/SUs at the price that has been accepted. The
optimal reserve prices for each PU and SU are calculated based
on the CDFs. Also, the PUs and SUs determine their asks and
bids to maximize their expected payoffs, respectively. If a bid
of an SU is greater than or equal to an ask of a PU, the channel
leasing agreement is performed between them. The process
continues until the spectrum pool of the PUs is empty.
The spectrum auction proposed in [138] guarantees that the
PU’s revenue is not too low. However, this approach is used
only for the PU with a single channel. The PU may have
more than one channel, and the multi-winner auctions such as
the VCG auction can be applied. However, the VCG auction
aims to maximize the social welfare rather than to increase
the PU’s revenue. Moreover, the VCG auction is susceptible
to the collusion [140]. One reason is that the prices set by
the auction are sometimes too low, and the losers can afford
the prices. For example, the losers can collude to win channels
and have sufficient margins to make extra profits by subleasing
the channels to others.
To prevent the collusion among SUs while improving the
PU’s revenue and maximizing the spectrum utilization, the
authors in [141] remodeled the multi-winner spectrum auction
into a single-winner spectrum auction by introducing the
concept of virtual bidders. Specifically, SUs without mutual
interference are grouped into a virtual bidder, the bid of which
equals the sum of the individual bids. The virtual bidder with
the highest bid is the winner of the channel. The winner pays
the PU the price equal to the bid of the highest losing virtual
bidder. Then, the payment among SUs within the winning
virtual bidder is calculated so as to maximize the product of
the individual payoffs. This ensures that the profits are shared
among the SUs as equally as possible, and the PU’s revenue
is relatively high. Moreover, if some losers collude to beat the
winners by raising their bids, the losers will have to pay a high
price. Thus the loser collusion is eliminated. The simulation
results showed that with the proposed pricing strategy, the
colluding gains drop significantly compared with that based
on the VCG auction.
Although the solution in [141] avoids the collusion among
the losers, there may be the sublease collusion among the
winning SUs and the losing SUs. For example, the winning
SUs sublease their channels to the losing SUs at acceptable
prices to gain their revenue. Such collusion deteriorates the
spectrum efficiency and the PU’s revenue. However, the sub-
lease collusion may be avoided if the prices to the winning
SUs are set such that the total payment of the winning SUs is
larger than the total payment of the losing SUs. The authors in
[142] imposed this condition instead of using the constraint of
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(seller)
Sources 
(buyers)
Group bid
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Group 
agent
Fig. 15. Collusion-resistance based on double auction.
the optimization problem in [141]. The optimization problem
now becomes convex and is efficiently solved by the numerical
methods [75]. In practice, the collusion among the losers
happens more often than that among the winners since the
payoffs of the losers are typically not fulfilled. Thus the
auctioneer may provide the losers more incentives, but this
may make the auctioneer’s budget not balanced.
To guarantee both the budget-balance and the collusion-
resistance, the authors in [143] adopted the double auction
when assigning relay nodes to sources in cooperative wireless
networks. The model is shown in Fig. 15 where the sources
act as buyers, and the relays are sellers. The sources which can
share a relay are merged into a group and represented by a so-
called group agent. First, each source submits a set of its bids
for all relays to its group agent. The group agent determines
the candidate winners and the losers within its group. The
agent also recalculates group bids for relays and incentives
reserved for the losers. The incentives for the losers are
extracted proportionally to the bids of the candidate winners.
Then, the group agents and the relays submit theirs group
bids and asks to the auctioneer, respectively. The auctioneer
determines the winning group agents and the winning relays
based on the maximum weight matching [72]. Since the losing
group agents can also collude with each other, the incentives
for them are required to be proportional to the auctioneer’s
revenue.
Apart from the collusion among the bidders, there is another
form of collusion in which the cheating auctioneer conspires
with greedy bidders to illegally fix the price, namely the bid-
rigging. To prevent bid-riggings in spectrum allocation, the
authors in [42] adopted a variant of VCG auction integrated
with the homomorphic encryption. Specifically, each bidder,
i.e., an unlicensed user, submits its identity, location informa-
tion, and bid for a set of spectrum bands to the auctioneer,
i.e., the seller. In particular, the bid is represented by a vector
of ciphertexts generated by the homomorphic encryption. The
auctioneer determines the winners based on the encrypted
bids using the homomorphic addition property. Based on the
VCG auction, the auctioneer then determines the price of each
set of spectrum bands for each bidder using the Shamir’s
polynomial secret sharing [144]. Given the prices, each bidder
decides a set of spectrum bands to maximize its own utility.
The security analysis stated that unless the servers which
are deployed to encrypt/decrypt bids collude, the auctioneer
cannot decrypt vectors representing the bidders’ bids. Also,
the bid-rigging between the bidders and the auctioneer is
meaningless since the individual server itself knows nothing
more than the winners’ identities and their payments.
The same approach can be found in [145] in which the
auctioneer is a broker, i.e., the seller, and the greedy bidders
are Base Stations (BSs). In this approach, the Paillier cryp-
tosystem was used to generate vectors of ciphertexts for the
bidders’ bids. Moreover, the encrypted bids are randomized
by a random constant which is generated by an intermediate
federal gateway. From these randomized encrypted bids, the
auctioneer determines the winners and selects an optimal
spectrum allocation so as to maximize the sum of the bids.
Given the optimal allocation, the charging price for each
winner is determined according to the VCG auction-based
pricing policy. Note that with the homomorphic addition prop-
erty of the Paillier cryptosystem, the auctioneer determines
the winning allocation and the charging prices without any
knowledge of the original bids of the BSs. Thus the bid-rigging
between the auctioneer and a greedy bidder is avoided. In fact,
this can be guaranteed even if the bidder colludes with the
auctioneer since its bid is randomized by the federal gateway.
B. False-Name Bids
The key idea to prevent the false-name bid cheating of a
bidder is to make the utility of the bidder not increase by
using multiple fictitious identifiers compared to the case in
which the bidder uses a single identifier.
The authors in [146] proposed a pricing strategy for each
SU in CRNs to prevent the false-name bid cheating in the
spectrum auctions as shown in Fig. 16. The proposed ap-
proach consists of three steps. In the first step, each SU
submits its bid for a set of channels to an auctioneer, i.e.,
a PU. To maximize the spectrum reusability while satisfying
the interference constraints, the breadth-first-search procedure
[147] was applied to sort the bidders in a descending order
of their bids. In the second step, the PU computes the price
for each bidder by multiplying the bidder’s bid with the bid
of its critical neighbor. A critical neighbor of a bidder is one
of its interfering/conflicting neighbors that if the bidder bids
higher than that of the critical neighbor, the bidder will receive
a channel. However, if the bidder bids lower than the critical
neighbor, the bidder will not be allocated a channel. In the
third step, the PU compares the bid of each bidder with its
computed price. If the bid is greater than its computed price,
the bidder is the winner. Otherwise, the bidder is the loser.
The pricing strategy in [146] was proved as to guarantee that
a bidder using a single identifier obtains its requested channel
with a utility that is not less than the sum of utilities obtained
by using more than one identifier. The reason is that although
the bidder has multiple identifiers, these identifiers come from
the same location as the single identifier. Therefore, they have
the same critical neighbor and the same computed price. The
simulation results showed that the proposed scheme signifi-
cantly improves revenue and spectrum utilization up to 300%
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Fig. 16. An example of spectrum auction without false-name bid cheating
(a), and with false-name bid cheating (b). When bidder A uses two names,
i.e., A1 and A2, to bid for the same number of channels, its utility increases.
compared to the baseline [148] which sacrifices spectrum reuse
to maintain the false-name-proofness. However, the proposed
scheme did not support the privacy preserving for bids.
To support the privacy preserving while avoiding the false-
name bids, the authors in [47] adopted the ascending-bid
auction which is essentially similar to the ACA scheme in
[50]. The model includes a Licensed Shared Access (LSA)
repository, i.e., an auctioneer, and LSA licensees, i.e., bidders.
Assume that the conflict graph was created. Initially, the
auctioneer announces a reserve price vector for a vector of
channels. Each bidder responds with a demand vector which
includes portions of channels. At each round, for a channel, the
auctioneer determines if for any bidder the aggregate demand
of the bidder and its neighbors in the conflict graph is less
than the channel supply. If so, the portion of the channel is
assigned to the bidder. This process repeats by increasing the
round prices of channels until there is no demand for the
channels from the bidders. It is worth noting that a bidder
and the corresponding fictitious bidder have the same set of
neighbors. Thus unless the total demand from the neighbors
changes, a bidder cannot increase its utility with false-name
bids. Also, since the bidders only reveal their demand but not
prices, the proposed scheme achieves the price privacy for the
bidders.
Summary: This section discusses applications of pricing
models to prevent the collusion and false-name bidding cheat-
ing. The reviewed approaches along with their references are
summarized in Table XI. As seen, almost all the approaches
aim to prevent the collusion among the bidders or between
the bidders and the auctioneer in the spectrum allocation.
Therefore, more solutions to prevent the collusion behaviors
of sellers need to be considered. In the next section, we review
applications of economic and pricing models to address some
other security issues in wireless networks.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
In this section, we review some other issues related to the
use of pricing models for the wireless security.
A. Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attack in CRNs
In CRNs, Secondary Users (SUs) perform the spectrum
sensing to determine if a certain channel is occupied by
the Primary User’s (PU’s) transmission. A secondary Base
Transceiver Station (BTS) then decides the spectrum allocation
based on the sensing results of the SUs. However, some
malicious SUs can report falsified sensing results which is
commonly known as Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
(SSDF) attack. Such attack dramatically degrades the accuracy
of the final decision of the BTS and the effectiveness of spec-
trum sensing [149]. To prevent the SSDF attack, a reputation-
based sensing strategy can be adopted as proposed in [150].
Accordingly, each SU constructs its own reputation table
which stores reputation values of the SU towards other SUs in
the network. The values are determined based on the number
of the correct/wrong sensing results that the SU has received
from other SUs. The SU then combines its own sensing result
with the results of other SUs which have reputation values
greater than a threshold to improve the accuracy of sensing.
Finally, the VCG auction was adopted to perform a distributed
cheat-proof spectrum allocation. However, with the proposed
solution, SUs are required to continuously update their local
tables which may increase significantly energy consumption.
B. Misbehaviors in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks
Non-cooperative wireless networks are formed by nu-
merous heterogeneous nodes such as selfish and Byzantine
nodes [151], i.e., malicious nodes, which have different in-
tentions and behaviors. This makes network operations such
as information forwarding challenging. To handle the mis-
behaviors of the nodes, the authors in [151] proposed a
unified framework which consists of two schemes, i.e., the
Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction [152] and FORBID
mechanism [153]. The GSP auction is to incentivize selfish
nodes to cooperate while the FORBID mechanism detects
malicious nodes and isolates them from packet forwarding
paths. In this framework, a source as a buyer purchases the
packet forwarding service from other nodes, i.e., sellers, to
send data to the buyer’s destination. To stimulate the selfish
nodes to cooperate, each node in the forwarding path will
receive a payment from the source based on its submitted
ask. Then, when node i in the path receives a packet from
the source, it will forward this packet to the next hop node
j and keep an ACK message from node j as a receipt. This
receipt is used to get the payment from the source and identify
the suspects of malicious nodes. If node i cannot receive the
ACK message from node j, node i will suspect that node j
is malicious and record this information. At the same time,
node i is required to retransmit the packet with its highest
transmission power such that at least one neighbor node can
overhear, and this action of node i can be considered to be a
witness during the detection process.
Apart from the aforementioned misbehaviors, there are other
issues needed to be investigated. For example, malicious nodes
can collude to forge that a packet is successfully transmitted
to the destination, or instead of always choosing to reject the
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TABLE XI
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR PROTECTING AGAINST COLLUSION AND FALSE-BID NAME CHEATING BEHAVIORS (CN:
CELLULAR NETWORK, CRN: COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK, CWN: COOPERATIVE WIRELESS NETWORK)
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
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[138]
Vickrey
auction PU SUs Spectrum
Buyers are divided into bidding rings presented by
effective SUs. The winner is the effective SU with the
highest bid. The seller sets the price for the winner to
maximize the seller’s expected utility gain.
Collusion resistance, and
seller’s utility
improvement
Nash
equilibrium CRN
[139]
Double
auction PUs SUs Spectrum
Sellers and buyers determine their asks and bids based
on CDFs. Matching each seller with each buyer is
performed based on the double auction rule.
Collusion resistance, and
utility improvement for
both sellers and buyers
Market
equilibrium CRN
[141]
[142]
Multi-
winner
auction
PU SUs Spectrum
Buyers are grouped into virtual bidders, and the virtual
bidder with the highest bid is the winner. The payments
for the winning buyers are determined so as to maximize
the product of their payoffs
Collusion resistance,
seller’s utility and social
welfare improvement
Nash
bargaining
equilibrium
CRN
[143]
Double
auction Relays
Group
agents
Relay
service
The maximum weight matching is used to assign the
winning buyers to the winning sellers. The losing buyers
receive incentives extracted from the auctioneer’s
revenue.
Collusion resistance,
budget-balance,
individual rationality,
truthfulness, and social
welfare improvement
Market
equilibrium CWN
[42]
Variant
VCG
auction
Licensed
user
Unlicensed
users Spectrum
Buyers’ bids are encrypted using the homomorphic
encryption. The payment is determined based on the
Shamir’s polynomial secret sharing and the pricing
policy of the VCG auction.
Bid-rigging resistance,
spectrum utility
improvement
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
CRN
[145]
Variant
VCG
auction
Broker Basestations Spectrum
Same as [42], but the encrypted bids are randomized by
a random constant.
Bid-rigging resistance,
spectrum utility
improvement
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
CRN
Fa
ls
e-
na
m
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[146]
General
pricing PU SUs Spectrum
Each buyer is assigned a price which is determined
based on its critical neighbor. The auctioneer selects
buyers which have bids greater than their computed
prices as the winners.
False-name bid
resistance, spectrum
utility and revenue
improvement
Optimal
solution CRN
[47]
Ascending-
bid
auction
LSA
reposi-
tory
LSA
licensees Spectrum
Same as [50], but a buyer will be the winner if the
aggregate demand of the buyer and its neighbors is less
than the supply.
False-name bid cheating
resistance, and privacy
preserving
Walrasian
equilibrium CN
TABLE XII
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR PROTECTING AGAINST COLLUSION AND FALSE-BID NAME CHEATING
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[138] • Always guarantee the high utility for the PU
• Support only one PU and multiple SUs
• Support only the PU with a single channel
[141]
• Support the PU with multiple channels
• Avoid the collusion among the losing SUs
• Ignore sublease collusions among the winning SUs and
the losing SUs
• Ignore collusion between the auctioneer and greedy SUs
[42]
• Support the PU with multiple channels
• Avoid collusion between the auctioneer and the greedy SUs • Have high overhead communication
[146] • Have high spectrum utilization • Do not support the privacy preserving SUs’ bids
packets, they can forward packets occasionally to deceive other
nodes.
C. Faked Sensing Attack in Crowdsensing Networks
In crowdsensing networks, a large number of mobile devices
such as smartphones and tablets are used to gather and then
send their sensing data, e.g., road traffic condition, to a server.
However, the users may provide faked sensing reports with
the aim of saving sensing costs and avoiding privacy leakage.
Therefore, pricing models can be used to motivate the users
to submit true sensing reports and then to pay them according
to sensing accuracy. The first-price sealed-bid reverse auction
was used in [154] to achieve the goal. In this model, the users
as sellers choose asking prices, and the server as the buyer
determines the payment strategy to maximize their utility func-
tions. In particular, the utility functions of users are formed
from the actual costs which are unknown by the server. The
server thus employs the reinforcement learning method, i.e.,
Q-learning [155], to determine its optimal payment strategy
according to history of the utility received for the previous
trials. Such a payment strategy can motivate the users to send
high quality sensing reports while significantly decreasing the
number of faked sensing reports.
Summary: This section discusses the applications of pric-
ing models to address miscellaneous security issues in wireless
networks. The approaches aim to detect and prevent faults
or risks caused by attackers in CRNs, non-cooperative net-
works, and crowdsensing networks. Also, combining auctions
with learning algorithms is a useful solution to prevent the
attackers. Thus more advanced learning techniques need to be
investigated.
IX. CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A number of approaches reviewed in this survey evidently
show that economic and pricing models can address diverse
issues of wireless security. The ratios of economic and pricing
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Fig. 17. Summary information of percentage of wireless networks.
approaches for different types of wireless networks are shown
in Fig. 17. From the figure, we observe that majority of
the approaches are for cognitive radio networks and cellular
networks while few approaches are for cooperative wireless
networks and wireless sensor networks. The following dis-
cusses further some existing challenges and new research
directions.
A. Existing Challenges And Research Directions From Attack
Perspective
The proposed approach in [44] provided k-anonymity loca-
tion privacy for the buyers with the same privacy requirements.
However, the buyers practically have the different privacy
requirements, i.e., different values of k. A possible solution is
to divide the buyers into groups where buyers in a group have
the same k-anonymity requirement. However, the challenge is
how to determine the winning groups, especially when bids in
the same groups are considerably different. In fact, the buyers
with high bids can wait for more buyers arriving and then run
another auction. However, running the auction again on the
same buyers can make the auction lose the truthfulness.
Another issue in [44] is that the buyers and the sellers can
cheat their roles. For example, a buyer may pose as a seller
when participating in the auction. It might win the auction
and be added into the anonymity set. In this case, the buyer
receives privacy protection for free or even a payment from
other buyers. Designing a mechanism to guarantee that the
users will not lie their roles is an open problem.
B. Research Directions From Economic Tool Perspective
1) Contract theory: Almost all the solutions for preventing
eavesdropping presented in Section IV require the support of
the friendly jammer. However, the jamming cooperation is
only effective if the location information of the friendly jam-
mer is available to the source. Due to the location privacy, the
friendly jammer’s location might be unknown to the source.
Under such an asymmetric information scenario, the contract
theory [156] between the sources and the friendly jammers
can be adopted. However, how to determine performance-
price bundles to guarantee the highest utility for the sources
while motivating the friendly jammers to cooperate needs to
be developed.
2) Cyber insurance: Although there is a great deal of effort
in developing security solutions, still it is impossible to achieve
a perfect/near perfect security protection [157] because of
many factors, e.g., users’ behavior, network infrastructure,
and a wide variety of attacks. As a result, cyber insurance
is considered to be a potential and efficient solution for
cyber residual risk transfer and wireless security improvement.
In [158], the authors proposed an idea of using insurance in
spectrum trading to improve spectrum efficiency in CRNs. In
particular, the authors showed that by purchasing the PU’s
insurance, the SU will be insured against the potential acci-
dent, e.g., transmission failure incurred by the excessively low
SINR. Meanwhile, the PU will benefit, e.g., gaining a revenue,
from providing insurance services. Similarly, in [159], cyber
insurance was introduced as an effective solution to transfer
cyber risks, e.g., unavailable information, of Plug-in-Electronic
Vehicle (PEV) users to a cyber insurance company. Under
the insurance coverage, a PEV user is always guaranteed the
best price for charging/discharging even without information
from the power gird. Clearly, cyber insurance will be one of
the promising risk-mitigation solutions for wireless security.
However, many open issues arise, e.g., how to determine
optimal premium and insurance policy for different parties in
the networks.
C. Pricing Models for Security Issues in 5G HetNets
Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets) are one of key technolo-
gies which will be deployed in the fifth generation (5G) net-
work to support the deluge of data traffic. Due to the reduced
cell size in HetNets, users might move through multiple small
cells, e.g., picocell and femtocell, during their communication
session. The security is thus more challenging due to the
possible involvement of untrusted or compromised small cells
during handover [160]. Cryptographic methods which have
computation burden and complexity to both the small cells
and user sides are undesirable for 5G low-power small cell
infrastructures. Alternatively, economic and pricing models
can provide distributed solutions which maximize the secrecy
capacity for the 5G communication links without requiring
additional secure channels for key exchanges as well as the
complete knowledge of all channel information.
X. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a comprehensive survey of the
economic and pricing theory as well as their applications
for wireless security issues. Firstly, we have presented an
overview of the security issues in wireless networks. Then,
we have introduced different economic and pricing models
to understand motivations of using these models for the
security issues. Afterwards, we have provided detailed reviews,
analyses, and comparisons of the approaches using economic
and pricing models to address a variety of security issues
in wireless networks, i.e., eavesdropping attack, DoS attack,
privacy leakage, spectrum sensing data falsification attack,
faked sensing attack, and illegitimate behaviors of malicious
users. Finally, we have outlined open issues and future research
directions. In conclusion, this paper will be a keystone for
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understanding how to apply the economic and pricing theories
to address the security issues in wireless networks. This will be
first step for further deep and broad research of the economic
and pricing theories in next generation wireless networks.
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